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There are 4 comments on A World without Public Health

  1. I hope you had a good and restful Intersession!

    With regard to motor vehicle accident mortality, were you aware that many, many years ago I had published a study on motor vehicle accident mortality related to State motor vehicle inspection, namely, comparing those states (such as MA) that had annual motor vehicle inspection with those that did not? I will send you a copy of the paper (or bring one with me when we meet on Tuesday).
    Also, Ralph Hingson (former Chair of Behavioral Science) and Tim Heeren have done pioneeering work at BUSPH on mortality from motor vehicle accidents related to drunk driving, seat belt usage and other factors.
    Also, as I recall, the denominator of million-miles-driven is somewhat tricky. Over time, and with the changes in the power of motor vehicles and the evolution of super highways, the risks involved in driving one million miles are far different now than they were, say, 40 years ago when BUSPH was founded. I think it is exceedingly difficult to find an appropriate denominator for the examination of trends over time in risk of motor vehicle accident mortality.
    I look forward to seeing you on Tuesday!

    1. Ted: These are excellent points, thanks for raising them. I agree about the denominator issue. I look forward to seeing the paper you mention and to catching up later this week. Happy new year.
      Warmly
      Sandro

  2. A very interesting exercise, which prompts me to make a few observations. Please forgive what has turned into a rather lengthy treatise, but perhaps that is to be expected given the last 20 years I have spent participating in and observing the tobacco control movement.

    As a more general observation, I think it’s helpful to put the estimate of lives saved in the context of the total actual number of deaths in the U.S. that have occurred or will occur between 1901-2032. Using some rough calculations, I came up with a total of 226,565,000 deaths. If the estimate of almost 49 million lives saved is roughly accurate, that works out to about a 17.5% reduction in the overall number of deaths from the efforts described in this piece. Of course, since all those people did or will die anyway, it is probably more appropriate to think of the concept as lowering the death rate or extending life-years. Perhaps the next step would be to consider these measures, if anyone were interested in taking this exercise further.

    On to tobacco:
    First, while lung cancer is often used as the disease to track the effect of changes in tobacco use (because the population attributable fraction due to smoking is about 85%), it is of course only one of the many causes of death due to smoking. Smoking plays an important role in four of the top five causes of death in the US: cancer of many sites, heart disease, chronic respiratory disease, and stroke. Lung cancer alone accounts for about 30% of all smoking-related deaths. Thus, we could also ascribe about 2.5 million additional lives saved by tobacco control efforts (ignoring the double-counting of cardiovascular disease for the moment). An additional 50,000 deaths per year are estimated to be caused by exposure to secondhand smoke.

    Second, selecting a very few specific events as the drivers of decrease in tobacco consumption necessarily requires an over-simplification of a complex decades-long process, a point with which I’m sure the authors of the analysis would agree. And even events that may serve as inflection points have antecedents. Just to cite one example of the latter, the Fairness Doctrine (passed by Congress, required equal time for anti-smoking public service announcements in response to tobacco company ads on television, and quickly led to the end of cigarette advertising on that medium) would not have happened without the issuance of the Surgeon General’s report tying smoking to lung cancer (among men only!), which itself would have not come about in the absence of the studies in the 1950s that made the link, and the battle, fought out in a range of venues from scientific papers to the pages of Reader’s Digest, to establish that smoking was indeed a cause of lung cancer even though it didn’t fit the infectious disease paradigm.

    I would also argue that the Master Settlement Agreement between the tobacco companies and the state attorneys-general may have occurred coincident with an inflection point but was not itself a driver. Contrary to the original intentions, little of the settlement was actually spent by states on tobacco control. In fact, the MSA is better thought of as a marker of other drivers. Prominent among those I would identify the non-smokers’ rights movement, the legal strategy against the tobacco companies that led to the surfacing of damning documents that exposed the tobacco companies’ efforts at manipulation and obfuscation, and—perhaps most critically—the public’s acceptance of the studies that linked secondhand smoke (SHS) to lung cancer. This last development shifted the broader public’s perspective from viewing smoking as a perhaps regrettable but personal lifestyle choice to one of seeing it as a danger to the 75% of the population that didn’t smoke. The acceptance of this link was itself eased by the fact that smoking rates had declined (increasing the number of people in the category of those affected by SHS rather than producing it) and that the groundwork had been prepared due to earlier anti-smoking efforts. The result was a culture shift that began to view smoking as a non-normative behavior and an explosion of restrictions on smoking in an increasing number of venues. In a counterfactual world in which none of these public health measures were implemented, the excess toll of premature deaths would have been even greater than estimated under the assumption that the smoking rate would have declined but at a slower rate.

    While certainly a triumph of public health, it’s important to recognize that as smoking declined, the main beneficiaries were those with higher income and educational attainment. As smoking became more concentrated among the poor and those with less educational attainment, it became politically easier to impose restrictions because those higher on the ladder were not impacted. There was also a tendency to blame the smoker rather than recognize the condition as an addiction that required treatment (e.g., compare the lack of sympathy for victims of lung cancer compared to some other cancers). This gap has only continued to increase. Today, fewer than 10% of persons with a college degree smoke compared to approximately 30% of those with less than a high school education, a percentage that has not decreased for more than 20 years. A higher smoking rate also translates to much greater exposure to SHS for both adults and children–how many people at BUSPH any longer have any significant exposure to SHS? As a result, those in a lower socioeconomic position bear a highly disproportionate burden of diseases from smoking. It does lead one to wonder how history may have been different if the roles had been reversed. The social stratification of smoking is now playing out on a global scale, as 80% of all cigarettes are now consumed among low- and middle-income countries.

    As the first (?) major public health effort to reduce a non-communicable disease resulting from a widespread exposure, the anti-smoking effort is a source of many lessons both in the similarities and differences in strategies compared with other exposures and what to emulate and what to do differently.

  3. Thank you to Professor Brooks for these points. I agree with all of them. Here are the four points that emerge for me from Professor Brooks’ thoughtful comment.

    1. The consequences of public health action are compounded over time, suggesting that our estimate of the consequences of public health inaction are conservative. It is likely that one action not having been taken predisposes to another action also not being taken, with compound influence on the health of populations. This is of course foundational to the life course approach about which I have previously commented.

    2. We did not mention health equity in this Dean’s Note and the point is well taken that widening health gaps is as much a consequence of public health inaction as is the overall increase in preventable deaths. Further analysis could elucidate the implications of these inactions for health inequities.

    3. The methods we use here are limited by the counterfactual assumptions that underlie these approaches. It is hard to imagine a world where all else is the same except for inaction on one particular public health dimension. It is a limitation worth formally acknowledging, even if our capacity to address is limited.

    4. I agree with Professor Brooks that there is much that can be learned from tobacco. I wrote about this a little when I commented on social movements. One way one could have conducted this exercise is not to say ‘what would have happened had there been public health inaction’, but rather ‘what would have happened had we had earlier/better public health action’. That can be a rallying cry indeed, informed by cases (such as tobacco) where a social consensus emerged that prevented an extraordinary number of deaths.

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