Lewis Wang’s paper published online at Synthese
Graduate student, Lewis Wang, had his paper “On the Epistemic Instrumentalist Solution to the Combinatorial Problem” published online at Synthese. It is available to read here.
Abstract:
The Combinatorial Problem is the problem of how to combine epistemic and practical reasons for belief together into an all-things-considered verdict on what one ought to believe. It is a problem primarily for inclusivists about reasons for belief, who take there to be both genuine epistemic reasons for belief and genuine practical reasons for belief. Steglich-Petersen and Skipper (Mind, 129(516), 1071–1094, 2020) have recently proposed a novel epistemic instrumentalist solution to the Combinatorial Problem. According to them, if we accept the view that epistemic reasons are a species of instrumental reasons, then we will have no problem weighing epistemic and practical reasons for belief against each other. In this paper, I argue against this solution. I first object that, due to the transitivity of transmission of reasons, this solution could give rise to too many reasons for belief. I then discuss two possible replies to my objection. Both fail, I argue, because they lead Steglich-Petersen and Skipper to the same dilemma of making their instrumentalist solution to the Combinatorial Problem either question-begging or moot.