Keith N. Hylton

Keith N. Hylton

William Fairfield Warren Distinguished Professor

Professor of Law

BA magna cum laude, Harvard University
JD, Harvard University
PhD in Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology


Biography

Keith Hylton, a William Fairfield Warren Distinguished Professor of Boston University and Professor of Law at Boston University School of Law, joined the BU Law faculty in 1995 after teaching for six years and receiving tenure at Northwestern University School of Law. He is a prolific scholar who is widely recognized for his work across a broad spectrum of topics in law and economics, including tort law, antitrust, labor law, intellectual property, civil procedure, and empirical legal analysis. He has published five books and more than 100 articles in numerous law and economics journals, and serves as an associate editor of the International Review of Law and Economics, a contributing editor of the Antitrust Law Journal, co-editor of Competition Policy International, and editor of the Social Science Research Network’s Torts & Products Liability Law eJournal. He is currently president of the American Law and Economics Association (2017–2018 term).  He is a former chair of the Section on Torts and Compensation Systems of the American Association of Law Schools, a former chair of the Section on Antitrust and Economic Regulation of the American Association of Law Schools, a former director of the American Law and Economics Association, a former secretary of the American Bar Association Labor and Employment Law Section, a former member of the editorial board of the Journal of Legal Education, former chair of the Law and Economics section of the American Association of Law Schools, and a current member of the American Law Institute.

Publications

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  • Keith N. Hylton, Selling Out: An Instrumentalist Theory of Legal Ethics 34 The Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics (2021)
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  • Keith N. Hylton & Wendy Xu, Error Costs, Ratio Tests, and Patent Antitrust Law 56 Review of Industrial Organization (2020)
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  • Keith N. Hylton & Benjamin Ogden, Incentives to Take Care Under Contributory and Comparative Fault 61 International Review of Law and Economics (2020)
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  • Keith N. Hylton & Beixi Zhou, Causation and Incentives with Updating Courts 176 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (2020)
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  • Keith N. Hylton & Wendy Xu, Error Costs, Ratio Tests, and Patent Antitrust Law 56 Review of Industrial Organization (2020)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Economic Theory of Criminal Law Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance (2019)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Law and Economics Versus Economic Analysis of Law 48 European Journal of Law and Economics (2019)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Digital Platforms and Antitrust Law 98 Nebraska Law Review (2019)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Comment on 'Error and Regulatory Risk in Financial Institution Regulation' No. 18-29 Boston University School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper (2018)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Oligopoly Pricing and Richard Posner 18 Antitrust Source (2018)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Information Costs and the Civil Justice System No. 18-17 Boston University School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper (2018)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Whom Should We Punish, and How? Rational Incentives and Criminal Justice Reform 59 William & Mary Law Review (2018)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Deterrence and Aggregate Litigation No. 17-45 Boston University School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper (2018)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, The Wisdom of Douglas Ginsburg and the Competition Versus Innovation Confict, in Liber Amicorum - Volume 1 Douglas H. Ginsburg: An Antitrust Professor on the Bench (Nicholas Charbit, Carolina Malhado & Ellie Yang,2018)
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  • Keith N. Hylton & Mengxi Zhang, Optimal Remedies for Patent Infringement 52 International Review of Law and Economics (2017)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Law, Social Welfare, and Net Neutrality 50 Review of Industrial Organization (2017)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Economics of Criminal Procedure, in Volume 3: Public Law and Legal Institutions The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics (Francesco Parisi,2017)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Enhanced Damages for Patent Infringement: A Normative Approach 36 Review of Litigation (2017)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: A Brief Introduction, in The Cambridge Handbook of Antitrust, Intellectual Property, and High Tech (Roger D. Blair and D. Daniel Sokol,2016)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Scalia and Antitrust 30 Antitrust (2016)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Tort Law: A Modern Perspective (2016)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Patent Uncertainty: Toward a Framework with Applications 96 Boston University Law Review (2016)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Markovits on Defining Monopolization: A Comment 61 The Antitrust Bulletin (2016)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Roger Blair and Intellectual Property 61 Antitrust Bulletin (2016)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Should Antitrust Fines Target Firms or Agents?, in Global Antitrust Economics - Current Issues in Antitrust and Law (Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright,2016)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Haizhen Lin & Hyo-Youn Chu, Negligence and Two-Sided Causation 40 European Journal of Law and Economics (2015)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Reverse Payments Post Actavis: A Litigation Quagmire? CPI Antitrust Chronicle (2015)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Deterrence and Antitrust Punishment: Firms Versus Agents 100 Iowa Law Review (2015)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Class Actions and Class Action Waivers 23 Supreme Court Economic Review (2015)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Microsoft After Fifteen Years 11 Competition Policy International (2015)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Enforcement Regimes: Fundamental Differences, in 1 The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics (Roger D. Blair and D. Daniel Sokol,2015)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Microsoft's Antitrust Travails 14 Antitrust Magazine Online (2014)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Nuisance, in No. 14-60 Encyclopedia of Law and Economics (Alain Marciano and Giovanni Battista Ramello,2014)
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  • Keith N. Hylton & Haizhen Lin, Innovation and Optimal Punishment, with Antitrust Applications 10 Journal of Competition Law and Economics (2014)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Information and Causation in Tort Law: Generalizing the Learned Hand Test for Causation Cases 7 Journal of Tort Law (2014)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of the Restatement and of the Common Law 79 Brooklyn Law Review (2014)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, A Unified Framework for Competition Policy and Innovation Policy 22 Texas Intellectual Property Law Journal (2014)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Toward a Regulatory Framework for Third-Party Funding of Litigation 63 DePaul Law Review (2014)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Causation in Tort Law: A Reconsideration, in Research Handbook on the Economics of Torts (2013)
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  • Keith N. Hylton & Sungjoon Cho, Injunctive and Reverse Settlements in Competition-Blocking Litigation 36 European Journal of Law and Economics (2013)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, The Law and Economics of Products Liability 88 Notre Dame Law Review (2013)
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  • Keith N. Hylton & Haizhen Lin, Negligence, Causation, and Incentives for Care 35 International Review of Law and Economics (2013)
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  • Keith N. Hylton & Ronald A. Cass, Laws of Creation: Property Rights in the World of Ideas (2013)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Necessity 41 Journal of Legal Studies (2012)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Third-Party Financed Litigation 8 Journal of Law, Economics & Policy (2012)
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  • Keith N. Hylton & Haizhen Lin, Trial Selection Theory and Evidence, in Encyclopedia of Law and Economics: Procedural Law and Economics (C.W. Sanchirico,2012)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, New Private Law Theory and Tort Law: A Comment 125 Boston University School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper (2012)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Some Notes on Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Criminal Law, in Research Handbook on the Economics of Criminal Law (Alon Harel and Keith N. Hylton,2012)
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  • Keith N. Hylton & Alon Harel, Research Handbook on the Economics of Criminal Law (2012)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, An Economic Perspective on Preemption 53 Boston College Law Review (2012)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Yulia Rodionova & Fei Deng, Church and State: An Economic Analysis 13 American Law and Economics Review (2011)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Brown Shoe Versus the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 39 Review of Industrial Organization (2011)
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  • Keith N. Hylton & Haizhen Lin, American and European Monopolization Law: A Doctrinal and Empirical Comparison, in Competition Policy and Patent Law under Uncertainty : Regulating Innovation (Geoffrey A. Manne and Joshua D. Wright,2011)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Nuisance Law, in Research Handbook on the Economics of Property Law (Kenneth Ayotte and Henry E. Smith,2011)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Efficient Deterrence and Crime Control, in Criminal Law Conversations (Paul H. Robinson, Stephen P. Garvey & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan,2011)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Property Rules and Defensive Conduct in Tort Law Theory 4 Journal of Tort Law (2011)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, PANEL I: PROFESSOR BRODLEY’S GENERAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO ANTITRUST SCHOLARSHIP : INTRODUCTION 90 Boston University Law Review (2010)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Intent in Tort Law 44 Valparaiso University Law Review (2010)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Injunctive and Reverse Settlements 12 American Law and Economics Review (2010)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Intel and the Death of U.S. Antitrust Law 2 The CPI Antitrust Journal (2010)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Public Nuisance Law and the New Enforcement Actions 18 Supreme Court Economic Review (2010)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, The Law and Economics of Monopolization Standards, in Antitrust Law and Economics (Keith N. Hylton,2010)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Optimal Antitrust Enforcement, Dynamic Competition, and Changing Economic Conditions 77 Antitrust Law Journal (2010)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Law and Economics (2010)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Larry E. Ribstein, Paul H. Rubin & Todd J. Zywicki, Balancing of Markets, Litigation and Regulation 7 Journal of Law, Economics & Policy (2010)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Political Economy of Criminal Procedure, in Criminal Law and Economics (N. Garoupa,2009)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, A Comment on the Intel Fine June 2009 GCP: The Online Magazine for Global Competition Policy (2009)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Remedies, Antitrust Law, and Microsoft: Comment on Shapiro 75 Antitrust Law Journal (2009)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Tort Duties of Landowners: A Positive Theory 44 Wake Forest Law Review (2009)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Calabresi's Influence on Law and Economics, in Pioneers of Law and Economics (Lloyd R. Cohen & Joshua D. Wright,2009)
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  • Keith N. Hylton & David S. Evans, The Lawful Acquisition and Exercise of Monopoly Power and its Implications for the Objectives of Antitrust 4 Competition Policy International (2008)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Unilateral Refusals to Deal and the Antitrust Modernization Commission Report 53 Antitrust Bulletin (2008)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Due Process and Punitive Damages: An Economic Approach 2 Charleston Law Review (2008)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Weyerhaeuser, Predatory Bidding, and Error Costs 53 The Antitrust Bulletin (2008)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, The Economic Theory of Nuisance Law and Implications for Environmental Regulation 58 Case Western Reserve Law Review (2008)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Preemption and Products Liability: A Positive Theory 16 Supreme Court Economic Review (2008)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, When Should a Case Be Dismissed? The Economics of Pleading and Summary Judgment Standards 16 Supreme Court Economic Review (2008)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, A Positive Theory of Strict Liability 4 Review of Law & Economics (2008)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Asbestos and Mass Torts with Fraudulent Victims 37 Southwestern Law Review (2008)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, A Theory of Wealth and Punitive Damages 17 Widener Law Journal (2008)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Reflections on Remedies and Philip Morris v. Williams 27 The Review of Litigation (2007)
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  • Keith N. Hylton & Fei Deng, Antitrust Around the World: An Empirical Analysis of the Scope of Competition Laws and Their Effects 74 Antitrust Law Journal (2007)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Biomedical Ethics and the Law: A Critical Perspective 15 Jahrbuch fur Recht und Ethik (2007)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Immunity: An Application to Cyberspace 87 Boston University Law Review (2007)
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  • Keith N. Hylton & Vikramaditya Khanna, A Public Choice Theory of Criminal Procedure 15 Supreme Court Economic Review (2007)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Duty in Tort Law: An Economic Approach 75 Fordham Law Review (2006)
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  • Brief Amicus Curiae of Professors Keith N. Hylton, Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Mark F. Grady, Jeffrey L. Harrison, Mark G. Kelman, and Thomas Ulen in Support of Respondents in Philip Morris USA v. Mayola Williams
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Information, Litigation, and Common Law Evolution 8 American Law and Economics Review (2006)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Development Lending and the Community Reinvestment Act 29 Western New England Law Review (2006)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Torts and Choice of Law: Searching for Principles 56 Journal of Legal Education (2006)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Liability Externalities and the Law: A Comment on Cooter and Porat 1 Journal of Tort Law (2006)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Property Rules and Liability Rules, Once Again 2 Review of Law & Economics (2006)
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  • Keith N. Hylton & Thomas J. Miceli, Should Tort Damages Be Multiplied? 21 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (2005)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Calabresi and the Intellectual History of Law and Economics 64 Maryland Law Review (2005)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, The Theory of Penalties and the Economics of Criminal Law 1 Review of Law and Economics (2005)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Arbitration: Governance Benefits and Enforcement Costs 80 Notre Dame Law Review (2005)
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  • Brief of Keith N. Hylton as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners in Greg Johnson, et al. v. Ford Motor Company
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Introduction Symposium: The Jurisprudence of Slavery Reparations: Introduction 84 Boston University Law Review (2004)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, A Framework for Reparations Claims 24 Boston College Third World Law Journal (2004)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Law and Economics of Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, in 53 Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Employment Arena: Proceedings of New York University 53rd Annual Conference on Labor (Samuel Estreicher & David Sherwyn,2004)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Slavery and Tort Law 84 Boston University Law Review (2004)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Law and the Future of Organized Labor in America 49 Wayne Law Review (2003)
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  • Keith N. Hylton & Christopher R. Drahozal, The Economics of Litigation and Arbitration: An Application to Franchise Contracts 32 Journal of Legal Studies (2003)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Law: Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution (2003)
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  • Brief of Keith N. Hylton as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Respondents in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Petitioner v. Curtis B. Campbell and Inez Preece Campbell, Respondents
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  • Keith N. Hylton, An Asymmetric Information Model of Litigation 22 International Review of Law and Economics (2002)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation Under Strict Liability 4 American Law and Economics Review (2002)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, When Should We Prefer Tort Law to Environmental Regulation? 41 Washburn Law Journal (2002)
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  • Keith N. Hylton & Michael Salinger, Reply to Grimes: Illusory Distinctions and Schisms in Tying Law 70 Antitrust Law Journal (2002)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Intent 74 Southern California Law Review (2001)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, The Theory of Tort Doctrine and the Restatement of Torts 54 Vanderbilt Law Review (2001)
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  • Keith N. Hylton & Michael Salinger, Tying Law and Policy: A Decision Theoretic Approach 69 Antitrust Law Journal (2001)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Banks and Inner Cities: Market and Regulatory Obstacles to Development Lending 17 Yale Journal on Regulation (2000)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic Analysis 8 Supreme Court Economic Review (2000)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Property Rights and the Human Body, in Encyclopedia of the American Constitution, Volume 4 (Leonard W. Levy & Kenneth L. Karst,2000)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, A Note on Trend-Spotting in the Case Law 40 Boston College Law Review (1999)
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  • Andy C.M. Chen & Keith N. Hylton, Procompetitive Theories of Vertical Control 50 Hastings Law Journal (1999)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Preserving Competition: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards and Microsoft 8 George Mason Law Review (1999)
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  • Keith N. Hylton & Vincent D. Rougeau, The Community Reinvestment Act: Questionable Premises and Perverse Incentives 18 Annual Review of Banking Law (1999)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties 87 Georgetown Law Journal (1998)
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  • Keith N. Hylton & Mark Lasser, Measuring Market Power When the Firm Has Power in the Input and Output Markets, in Economic Inputs, Legal Outputs: The Role of Economists in Modern Antitrust (Fred S. McChesney,1998)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Labor and the Supreme Court: Review of the 1996-1997 Term 13 Labor Lawyer (1997)
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  • Keith N. Hylton & Vincent D. Rougeau, Lending Discrimination: Economic Theory, Econometric Evidence, and the Community Reinvestment Act 85 Georgetown Law Journal (1996)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, A Theory of Minimum Contract Terms, with Implications for Labor Law 74 Texas Law Review (1996)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Optimal Law Enforcement and Victim Precaution 27 RAND Journal of Economics (1996)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Implications of Mill's Theory of Liberty for the Regulation of Hate Speech and Hate Crimes 3 University of Chicago Law School Roundtable (1996)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, A Missing Markets Theory of Tort Law 90 Northwestern University Law Review (1996)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Rule 68, The Modified British Rule, and Civil Litigation Reform 1 Michigan Law and Policy Review (1996)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, The Law and Ethics of Organ Sales 4 Annual Review of Law and Ethics/ Jahrbuch fur Recht und Ethik (1996)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Fee Shifting and Predictability of Law 71 Chicago-Kent Law Review (1995)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Review of Agenda for Reform: The Future of Employment Relationships and the Law. by William B. Gould, IV. 32 Journal of Economic Literature (1994) (book review)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, An Economic Theory of the Duty to Bargain 83 Georgetown Law Journal (1994)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Efficiency and Labor Law 87 Northwestern University Law Review (1993)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric Information and the Selection of Disputes for Litigation 22 Journal of Legal Studies (1993)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Litigation Cost Allocation Rules and Compliance with the Negligence Standard 22 Journal of Legal Studies (1993)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Fee Shifting and Incentives to Comply with the Law 46 Vanderbilt Law Review (1993)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, The Internalization Paradox and Workers' Compensation 21 Hofstra Law Review (1992)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Litigation Costs and the Economic Theory of Tort Law 46 University of Miami Law Review (1991)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Economic Rents and Essential Facilities 1991 Brigham Young University Law Review (1991)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Rent Appropriation and the Labor Law Doctrine of Successorship 70 Boston University Law Review (1990)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, The Law and Economics of Organ Procurement 12 Law & Policy (1990)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, The Influence of Litigation Costs on Deterrence Under Strict Liability and Under Negligence 10 International Review of Law and Economics (1990)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Costly Litigation and Legal Error Under Negligence 6 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (1990)
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  • Keith N. Hylton & Maria O'Brien, Rational Decisions and Regulation of Union Entry 34 Villanova Law Review (1989)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Are MIT Students Rational? 8 Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (1987)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Testing Overidentifying Restrictions with Inefficient Estimators 25 Economics Letters (1987)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, A Note on the Inefficiency of Non-Linear Estimators 17 Economics Letters (1985)
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  • Keith N. Hylton, Illusory Wage Differentials: Comment 74 The American Economic Review (1984)
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In the Media

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  • The Dallas Express February 28, 2023

    DOJ Seeks Sanctions over Google Chat Records

    Keith Hylton is quoted.
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  • CBS January 24, 2023

    Keller @ Large: Less to Ticketmaster Senate Showdown than Meets the Eye

    Keith Hylton is quoted.
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  • The Daily Beast November 7, 2022

    Musk Hints at Legal Claim over Twitter Boycott—and Organizers Yawn

    Keith Hylton is quoted.
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  • Marketplace September 19, 2022

    Why “Class Action Park” Is a Bit of a Misnomer

    Keith Hylton is quoted.
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  • Marketplace

    How High’s the Bar When It Comes to Suing an Amusement Park?

    Keith Hylton is quoted.
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  • The New Republic March 1, 2021

    The Incalculable Debt That America Owes Black People

    Keith Hylton is quoted.
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  • June 4, 2019

    Regulation Risks Ring Alarm Worldwide for Alphabet

    Keith Hylton is quoted in <em>Real Money</em>.
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  • May 15, 2019

    Keith Hylton joins Analysis Group as new affiliate

    BOSTON, May 14, 2019 /PRNewswire/ -- Analysis Group, one of the largest international economics consulting firms, is pleased to announce the promotions of Ted Davis to Managing Principal and Todd Schatzki to Principal, and welcome Vice President Michael Kuehn and six new academic and industry affiliates. "Intellectual rigor and creative problem solving underscore the work of these three exceptional consultants. Clients rely on their […]
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  • June 14, 2018

    Judge Approves Major AT&T-Time Warner Merger. It is a Go!

    Keith Hylton quoted in "Judge Approves Major AT&T-Time Warner Merger. It is a Go!", Law and Crime. 
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  • June 4, 2018

    Will the Major AT&T-Time Warner Merger Survive the Judge’s Wrath? Experts Explain.

    Keith Hylton quoted in "Will the Major AT&T-Time Warner Merger Survive the Judge’s Wrath? Experts Explain," Law and Crime.
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Stories from The Record

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Courses

Antitrust Law: LAW JD 838

4 credits

The antitrust laws reflect a conviction that competition in the marketplace will yield the best outcomes for consumers and the optimal allocation of resources in our economy. Beginning with the Sherman Act of 1890, the antitrust statutes condemn a variety of acts -- from mergers to agreements among competitors to monopolists' exclusionary business practices -- that restrain trade or contribute to monopoly power. The statutes, however, are written in general terms, leaving it to the courts to draw the line between lawful competition and unlawful restraints of trade or monopolization. Early on, the Supreme Court established that the law reaches only "unreasonable" restraints, which only begs the question of how to draw the line between "reasonable" competition and "unreasonable" interference with competitive markets. Over the course of the twentieth century, the courts struggled to fix this line; as the century closed, they had settled on an economically-oriented normative framework that largely deferred to firm decisions and doubted the value of government intervention in markets. In recent years, however, a cacophony of voices -- ranging from activists to scholars to politicians of all stripes -- has begun to call that framework into question and to call for renewed enforcement of antitrust laws. This course will explore the principal statutes and common law that have shaped antitrust law over the past century-and-a-quarter since Congress passed the Sherman Act. We will also examine the standards and procedures that the antitrust agencies use to evaluate mergers and to challenge conduct as anticompetitive. As we critically evaluate the case law, we will also reflect on current calls for reform. While we will engage rigorously with economics, all of the economic principles necessary to understand the case law and debates will be explained in the course; formal training in economics is not a requirement.

SPRG 2023: LAW JD 838 A1 , Jan 18th to Apr 26th 2023
Days Start End Credits Instructors Bldg Room
Mon,Wed 10:40 am 12:40 pm 4 Keith N. Hylton LAW 101

Economics of Intellectual Property Law (S): LAW JD 900

3 credits

This seminar will explore the economics of intellectual property law. There are no prerequisites. The readings for the seminar will consist of Cass and Hylton, Laws of Creation (2013), and several cases and articles. The seminar will emphasize understanding the policy justifications for the major doctrines in intellectual property. The topics studies will include patent law, copyright law, trademark law, trade secret law, and the intersection of antitrust and intellectual property. ENROLLMENT LIMIT: 14 students. GRADING NOTICE: This class will not offer the CR/NC/H option. **A student who fails to attend the initial meeting of a seminar (designated by an (S) in the title), or to obtain permission to be absent from either the instructor or the Registrar, may be administratively dropped from the seminar. Students who are on a wait list for a seminar are required to attend the first seminar meeting to be considered for enrollment.

FALL 2022: LAW JD 900 A1 , Sep 7th to Dec 7th 2022
Days Start End Credits Instructors Bldg Room
Wed 2:10 pm 4:10 pm 3 Keith N. Hylton LAW 417