Five Topics to Watch at the Fourth China-CELAC Forum

By Julie Radomski, Zara Albright and Rebecca Ray

As Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) leaders prepare for the upcoming China-CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum in Beijing, the meeting should be viewed less as a venue for announcing major new commitments and more as a continuation of existing diplomatic and economic dialogues. This gathering is expected to build incrementally on ongoing cooperation between China and LAC countries—reflected in recent high-level engagements such as last year’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Peru and the upcoming 2025 BRICS Summit in Brazil, as well as the many LAC presidential visits to China in 2023. Nevertheless, the Forum also offers LAC countries an opportunity to articulate collective development needs. By negotiating as a bloc on issues that are critical across the region, LAC countries could in theory secure more favorable terms to shape their strategic partnerships with China.

While headline-grabbing deals may be scarce in the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC Forum, important developments in five interrelated key issue areas are still likely to emerge.

1. Colombia’s quest for green energy

In October 2024, Colombia’s Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Jorge Rojas Rodríguez announced that the country was negotiating to join the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Although further details have not emerged, the 2025 China-CELAC Forum may be an opportunity to announce Colombia’s formal incorporation in the initiative. Joining the BRI could be an opportunity for Colombia to attract more Chinese investment in green and renewable energy, a key goal of President Gustavo Petro’s administration. On his 2023 visit to Beijing, President Petro signed several agreements related to economic cooperation, investment and sustainable development. Since then, the Colombian company Electryon Power and Chinese company Sungrow Hydrogen have established a partnership to develop green hydrogen projects. Colombia’s Agencia Nacional de Hidrocarburos announced a first-round tender for offshore wind projects in late 2024, in which China Three Gorges and Power China submitted bids.

Recent research by the Boston University Global Development Policy Center (GDP Center) has shown that foreign investment, in the absence of collaboration with local firms who can more effectively shape policy, is insufficient to affect a long-term energy transition in developing countries such as Colombia. These emerging links between Chinese and Colombian public and private sector actors may thus help overcome barriers to long-term success. Colombia’s approach to the BRI may echo that of Honduras, which sought renewable energy investments from China as a central objective of joining the initiative. As the current President Pro-Tempore of CELAC, Colombia may take the opportunity of the Forum to either join the BRI, sign agreements related to Chinese investments in green energy, or both.

2. Transition minerals

Given the increasing demand for certain minerals needed for the green energy transition, and the central role of China-Latin America flows responding to this demand, new transition mineral deals are one possible area of focus in the upcoming Forum. Increased investment, research and development, and technology transfer in the mining sector were highlighted in the last 2021 China-CELAC Joint Action Plan, and the significance of lithium and copper in particular has only increased in the years since.

In the case of lithium, prices now appear to be stabilizing after a significant dip during 2024, and several countries in Latin America stand ready to expand their production. In addition to the “lithium triangle” of Argentina, Chile and Bolivia, Peru’s development of hardrock lithium extraction in the Puno region has raised expectations. In Brazil, BYD’s acquisition of hardrock lithium concessions in Brazil late 2023 recently became public knowledge, though reportedly still in an exploratory stage. Brazil is actively working to expand lithium extraction in its so-called “Lithium Valley,” in spite of significant local contestation and negative environmental and social impacts already emerging. Niobium is another mineral for which Brazil is hoping to attract foreign investment, especially given that over 90 percent of global known reserves are located in the country and a recent technological breakthrough by Chinese scientists in the use of this mineral.

The other transition mineral most relevant in the Latin America-China relationship is copper, for which Chile and Peru are already dominant exporters. Unlike lithium, which may see decreased demand in the future depending on advances in battery technology, demand for copper will remain high in any future technological scenario. Peru has already been an important destination for Chinese-financed copper mining projects for over a decade, with expansions and reinvestments in these mines over time. Beyond Chile and Peru, the current Argentinian administration is also aiming to expand copper production, with eight projects already at an advanced exploration stage. Given the previous successes of Chinese companies in working with Argentina’s provincial governments—key actors in mining governance within the country’s federalist system—there is likely to be continued interest and cooperation in this sector.

Alongside potential new transition mineral deals, it will be essential for LAC countries, development financing institutions and investing companies to prioritize robust environmental and social risk management (ESRM) frameworks. As a new report published by the GDP Center highlights, a just energy transition will require attention to building sustainable and inclusive transition mineral supply chains. At the same time, China-CELAC forum also presents an opportunity for the region to strategize around moving up the value chain—taking inspiration from Chile’s efforts to secure investment in lithium processing during the last Belt and Road Forum.

3. Trade

Since the start of April, all eyes have been on global trade disruptions from the US’ imposition of 10 percent tariffs on goods from most LAC countries and a series of tariffs totaling at least 100 percent for Chinese goods, as of publication. However, the last few months have also brought trade disruptions between China and LAC economies beyond the US’ tariffs. For example, in 2024, Brazil, Chile and Colombia applied anti-dumping tariffs of 25-35 percent on steel from China, the world’s largest producer, amid cratering prices brought on in part by turbulence in China’s construction sector. While the flurry of steel protections seems to be abating, agricultural trade between China and LAC may be moving to the center of discussions.

Trade in agriculture may feature heavily in the China-CELAC agenda and in bilateral discussions alongside the Forum. In 2018, during the first US-China trade dispute, several LAC countries’ agricultural exports to China increased, as China sourced products such as soy and beef from outside the US. The recent 10-15 percent tariffs on imports of US agricultural products that China set in March 2025 may provoke a similar shift, with Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay likely to benefit.

This potential is complicated by China’s ongoing World Trade Organization (WTO) safeguard investigation into beef imports, precipitated by domestic agricultural associations’ claims that growing imports, especially from South America, have depressed prices in the local market. Several LAC countries are in the process of negotiating phytosanitary protocols for other agricultural products with China. A year after the Ecuador-China FTA entered into force, Ecuador is negotiating to export quinoa, avocados, blueberries, pineapple and dairy products. Argentina is seeking market access for beans, chickpeas, lentils, and additional pork and beef products. Peru and China are in the process of establishing phytosanitary protocols for beef and pork exports, as well as for pomegranates, dragonfruit, cherries and blueberries. The 2025 China-CELAC Forum may be an opportunity to announce conclusions or progress on these already ongoing negotiations for phytosanitary protocols and China-LAC trade in agriculture.

4. Alternatives to premature deindustrialization

Over the last decade, research by the GDP Center has traced the impact of Chinese demand for raw commodities on LAC premature deindustrialization (also known as re-primarization) as manufacturing sectors have given way to a return to the basic minerals and agricultural exports of past eras. Low-technology sectors bring a wide array of risks to the LAC region, from higher vulnerability to commodity price instability, low long-term productivity growth, and a higher environmental impact and propensity for social conflicts. In recent years, this trend has accentuated. For example, in 2023, refined copper fell off of LAC’s top five exports to China, replaced by beef. This change meant that all of the top five exports from the region to China (including unrefined copper, soybeans, unrefined iron, crude oil and beef) were raw commodities with very little value added.

Over the last year, commodity dependence has brought new difficulties for LAC producers, as China has suspended beef imports from seven low-cost producers around the world – including Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay – in an attempt to cushion local producers from low global prices.

Furthermore, Latin American mineral producers have begun to prioritize moving up the value chains in this traditional sector, with some cooperation from Chinese investors. For example, Chile secured a Chinese commitment to build a cathode factory locally rather than simply extracting lithium for export in its raw form. Given current tensions in low-value-added sectors and these new steps in shifting toward higher-technology production, as mentioned above, it’s likely that the China-CELAC Forum will include more discussions and possibly agreements on cooperation for technology cooperation and green industrial development. This moment offers a chance to leverage the region’s collective, location-specific assets to attract foreign direct investment in manufacturing and promote meaningful technology transfer across the value chain.

5. Alternatives to the US Dollar

Since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the dependence of the global financial system on US dollars has become a focal point of tension and analysis. High-income countries’ investors pulled out of developing economies in 2020, bringing instability in developing country debt and currency markets. Thus, developing economies have increasingly turned to central bank liquidity swaps and regional financial arrangements to cushion this source of volatility. Parallel to this trend has been a rise in the use of alternative currencies, particularly China’s renminbi (RMB). In 2023, the RMB was the world’s fifth most used currency, up from 35^th place in 2010. It is now the only developing economy currency in the top five.

Within the last year, these trends have accelerated. In 2024, the BRICS finance ministers and central bank governors’ joint statement highlighted ongoing discussions surrounding the development of a potential BRICS Cross-Border Payment Initiative (BCBPI). Within Latin America, central bank currency swap lines with China have played an important role in the financial safety net, including Argentina’s $5 billion swap line renewed in 2024 and currently due to last through 2025. Furthermore, since 2023, three LAC nations have begun conducting trade with China in RMB and their own national currencies rather than the USD: Brazil, Argentina and Bolivia. Given this uptick in interest in regional and bilateral alternatives to dependence on access to US dollars, it is likely that the China-CELAC Forum will bring expanded discussions and possible new agreements, furthering this line of cooperation. As China’s policy rates are now comparatively lower than those of Western financial institutions and private capital markets, LAC countries may find it strategic to advocate for long-term development financing from Chinese policy banks denominated in RMB. To support this shift, it will be equally important to expand trade settled in RMB, as Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil have done, ensuring that borrower countries generate the necessary revenue streams to repay such loans.

Conclusion

The fourth China-CELAC Forum should be understood as part of ongoing and increasingly institutionalized dialogues between China and Latin American countries. Discussions in recent years—whether through bilateral channels or forums such as APEC and BRICS—have laid the groundwork for sector-specific forms of engagement that are likely to be further developed in this meeting, rather than major high-profile announcements. Significant issue areas likely to be on the agenda at the China-CELAC Forum include cooperation in green energy, particularly as Colombia considers joining the BRI, and the growth of already extensive flows of transition minerals. Discussions are also likely to reflect concerns around trade relationships shaped by both shifting global tariff regimes and phytosanitary negotiations, the pursuit of higher value-added production models, as well as the increasingly salient question of alternatives to US dollar dependence. As such, the Forum offers a platform to expand areas of cooperation already in motion in the evolving China-LAC relationship.

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