Webinar Summary: China’s Global Energy Finance Database – Data Update, 2000-2023

By Thang Ha

On November 14, 2024, the Boston University Global Development Policy (GDP) Center hosted a webinar on the latest data and trends in China’s overseas energy finance, based on the new update to China Global Energy Finance (CGEF) Database. The webinar was moderated by Rebecca Ray, Senior Academic Researcher with the Global China Initiative (GCI), and featured a presentation by Jiaqi Lu, GCI Senior Academic Researcher, and Diego Morro, GCI Data Analyst and Database Manager, as well as a database demonstration by Morro. The panelists discussed shifts in China’s global energy lending, key drivers of these changes and their implications for the global energy landscape.

Morro began with a brief introduction of the CGEF database. Managed by the GDP Center, the CGEF Database is an interactive data project that tracks overseas energy finance from China’s two main development finance institutions (DFIs)—the China Development Bank (CDB) and the China Export-Import Bank (CHEXIM). As of 2023, it records data on 367 energy-related loans, totaling $209 billion across 68 countries. This database provides insights into lending patterns across energy subsectors, including power generation, transmission and distribution. Put in perspective, the World Bank during the same period committed $43 billion, nearly a fifth of CDB and CHEXIM’s energy lending.

Morro also discussed this year’s key updates, noting that Chinese energy lending peaked in the mid-2010s, with a sharp decline beginning in 2017. This trend continued through the pandemic, with 2022 marking a complete pause in overseas energy lending.

Next, Morro noted that China’s overseas energy finance has undergone a significant shift. Historically, 50 percent of Chinese loans were directed toward oil and gas projects, followed by hydropower (17 percent), coal (10 percent) and nuclear energy (4 percent). Renewables like solar and wind accounted for just 1 percent. Post-2021, however, Chinese energy finance has increasingly prioritized low-carbon energy, with hydropower accounting for 93.2 percent, and wind and solar 6.8 percent.

Morro emphasized that while the number of low-carbon energy projects is growing, their scale is much smaller compared to earlier fossil fuel investments. In 2023, the CGEF Database recorded three new projects in Madagascar, Uganda and Burkina Faso, with the average loan size of $167 million—well below the historical average of $574 million. However, this still reflects China’s strategic pivot to “small and beautiful” projects, which are more rapidly deployable and socially and environmentally sustainable.

On the CGEF Database’s methodological approach to data collection, Morro outlined a three-step process. First, the researchers use advanced web-scraping tools like Azure Cognitive Webservice API, GDELT Project news sites and Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China to identify relevant reports and news articles in multiple languages. Next, algorithmic results are supplemented with data collected manually from recipient government sources and official disclosures. Last, the data is double verified by corroborating findings with Chinese and non-Chinese sources.

Lu then went on to explore the key drivers of China’s shift to a more cautious approach. First, China is increasingly committed to South-South cooperation. Between 2013 and 2022, China mobilized $45 billion in international climate finance, highlighting its role as a leader in supporting clean energy transitions in developing countries. At the same time, China is facing significant international pressure to align its overseas lending with global climate goals. Developed countries have urged Beijing to halt coal financing and increase support for clean energy.

Lu explained that China’s recent commitments at major international forums have reinforced this shift. At the 2023 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Forum, China launched the Green Investment and Finance Partnership and two new financing windows worth $49 billion to support green investments in BRI countries. At the recent Ninth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, China pledged to fund 30 clean energy projects in Africa over the next three years, alongside kickstarting the China-Africa Nuclear Energy Forum to promote knowledge exchange in nuclear technology. These policy initiatives align with China’s broader transition toward low-carbon energy finance away from fossil fuel projects. The new update to CGEF Database reflects this trend, featuring three new low-carbon energy projects in 2023.

Following the presentation, Morro illustrated how to use the CGEF Database and explore data on China’s energy lending by energy source, sector, year, recipient region and lender.

Moving to the discussion section moderated by Ray, Morro delved into the rationale behind the CGEF Database’s focus on public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) lending. Public lending goes to a national owned entity, or a public agency, entailing an explicit repayment obligation from the recipient. Publicly guaranteed loans do not necessarily go to government-owned entities and involve a guarantee, which in case of nonpayment, would hold the recipient government accountable.

Regarding the significant decline in Chinese energy loans, Lu underscored that it is not a post-pandemic phenomenon but materialized in 2017. Rather, the pandemic has served as an amplifier of older hurdles, particularly China’s risk aversion due to domestic economic hardships and lack of appetite for mega-level fossil fuel and hydropower projects. In addition, China is under international pressure to divest from fossil fuel projects. In recipient countries, local backlash against Chinese projects surrounding concerns about environmental, social and political risks have also complicated Chinese ventures. That said, Lu expected renewables and small-scale hydro projects, in light of China’s international commitments, to play a critical role in China’s energy finance moving forward.

Addressing the metaphor of “small belt, beautiful road,” Morro explained Xi Jinping’s pledge in 2021, which emphasizes small and more rapidly deployable projects that can deliver environmental and social benefits. The new CGEF Database update provides a hint of this commitment, as all three new energy-related projects are of small scale and focus on low-carbon sources such as solar and hydropower.

In terms of hurdles that China faces in scaling up energy finance globally, Lu identified a host of domestic and international factors. Domestic economic challenges and reduced fiscal capacity post-pandemic have limited the financial resource of China’s developmental institutions. On the other hand, Chinese DFIs can help alleviate the alleged overcapacity issue by creating new demands for renewable energy products in developing countries, which is materializing in their shift to overseas renewables lending. Overseas, technological barriers are also complicating the efforts to expand lending in renewables. Specifically, developing countries often lack the grid infrastructure needed to accommodate intermittent renewable energy sources, which prevent their ability to absorb a surge in renewable energy capital. Therefore, international investors, including China, should focus on improving the power infrastructure in developing countries to pave the way for more investment impacts.

With regard to the data ecosystem tracking global energy finance, Morro advised that in addition to the CGEF Database, the GDP Center hosts the China’s Global Power Database, as well as the China Overseas Finance Inventory (COFI) Database in collaboration with the World Resources Institute. The uniqueness of the CGEF Database lies in its coverage of diverse energy subsectors, whereas the CGP and COFI Databases focus exclusively on power generation. He noted that the CGEF Database only tracks international debts, while the CGP and COFI Databases can provide more insights in foreign direct investment, with the former specializing in the unit level and the latter covering the project level.

Discussing the prospects of China’s energy finance, Lu noted a growing share of low-carbon energy investments, driven by reduced funding for fossil fuel projects. While renewable investments remain smaller in absolute terms compared to late 2010s energy finance, this reflects the generally lower costs of wind and solar projects. The sole remaining fossil fuel project, the East Africa Oil Pipeline, faces uncertainty as no concrete financing steps have been announced by CDB or CHEXIM. Lu also argued that smaller hydropower projects, especially for energy storage alongside wind and solar farms, are likely to become more common, whereas environmental and social consequences will further discourage big-ticket hydropower projects.

The discussion highlighted China’s critical role in advancing climate finance and global renewable energy. With emissions potentially peaking by 2024, China is well-positioned to leverage its technology and resources to support developing countries in meeting their climate targets. However, the panelists noted that China’s financial contributions might not always be clearly defined, which could lead to further debate at international forums such as the United Nations Climate Change Conference. Despite these challenges, it emphasized China’s potential to elevate its role in global decarbonization efforts.

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Thang Ha is a Research Assistant with the Global China Initiative and a PhD student at Boston University’s Department of Political Science.

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