Reviving the Past or Risking the Future? Chinese-Financed Hydropower and the Fate of “Dinosaur Dams”
As countries around the world strive to meet their renewable energy targets, large hydroelectric dams are often framed as clean and reliable alternatives to fossil fuels. In the 21st century, Chinese development finance institutions (DFIs) have emerged as global leaders in financing hydropower, although many of these projects have faced severe environmental and social challenges that impinge upon their contributions to a green energy transition. A new working paper from the Boston University Global Development Policy Center reveals a widespread pattern in China’s global hydropower engagements—the resurrection of mid-20th century megadam designs.
Drawing on a medium-N dataset of 43 hydroelectric megaprojects (>100 MW) financed by the China Development Bank (CDB) and the China Export-Import Bank (CHEXIM) between 2000-2023, the paper documents the extent to which these projects rely on pre-existing studies—many of them decades old and initially developed by multilateral development banks (MDBs) such as the World Bank, the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). A tracing of the origins of each of these projects, based on project documents and MDB archives, reveals that 34 of the 43 projects (nearly 80 percent) are based on historical feasibility studies, and at least 20 can be directly traced to MDB project pipelines.
Figure 1: Historical Origins of Chinese-Financed Megadams
The reliance on “fossilized” project designs is a widespread feature of Chinese hydropower financing in the 21st century—particularly pronounced in Africa and Latin America (see Figure 2). In Africa, three-quarters of Chinese-financed megadams have MDB study origins; in Latin America, all seven projects in the dataset are based on historic designs, with most based on IDB-financed feasibility studies. Asia presents a partial exception: in Laos and other Mekong Basin countries, many Chinese-built dams appear to be new projects, likely reflecting China’s long-standing engagement and familiarity with the region. Elsewhere, however, the revival of older, shelved projects is more commonly observed. It prompts the question: why do these resurrections matter?
Figure 2: Regional Distribution of Project Origins
The working paper articulates two interlocking explanations for why bringing these “dinosaur dams” to life contributes to environmental and social risks.
1. These projects are “of a different era”
Hydropower studies developed during the 20th century were produced in a vastly different global development context—one in which environmental and social safeguards for development financing were minimal. In many cases, these projects were designed prior to critical frameworks like the 2000 World Commission on Dams (WCD) report or the recognition of the Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) for Indigenous peoples. Depending on the country context, they may also reflect outdated land tenure legal frameworks, colonial-era extractive priorities and antiquated conceptions of environmental risk.
2. These projects are “castoffs”
Many of the 43 Chinese DFI-financed megaprojects were not simply shelved—they were actively rejected by development financiers (often MDBs) due to environmental, social or economic risks. By taking on projects that more cautious lenders once deemed problematic, Chinese financiers are inheriting the liabilities of earlier eras. In this sense, the choice to build these dams reflects a misalignment between short-term energy goals and long-term impacts.
Three case studies—Coca Codo Sinclair (Ecuador), Souapiti (Guinea) and Jatigede (Indonesia)—flesh out these two mechanisms in practice. Coca Codo Sinclair is emblematic of the “dinosaur dam” phenomenon. Initially studied by the IDB and Ecuador’s INECEL (Ecuadorian Institute of Electrification) in the 1970s and 1980s, the project was shelved. The final studies were completed in 1992 but archived due to changing development finance norms and growing skepticism about megadams. Yet when the administration of the former President of Ecuador Rafael Correa revived Coca Codo Sinclair (CCS) in the 2000s, it reused these historical studies with only minimal updates. The IDB declined to finance the revived project without significant additional environmental data. Unwilling to delay, Ecuador turned to CHEXIM and Sinohydro, who agreed to finance and build the dam.
Today, CCS is in crisis. Since 2020, regressive erosion of the Coca River—triggered by the collapse of the San Rafael waterfall—has crept to within 3.6 kilometers of the dam. Geologists warn that the erosion will likely reach the dam in the coming years, eventually leading to structural failure. While there is no scientific consensus as to whether the erosion was triggered by the dam itself, the area’s geomorphological instability was not adequately accounted for in the project’s environmental studies. The project, which supplies about 25 percent of Ecuador’s electricity, has become a symbol of reputational risk for Chinese development banks and a cautionary tale about environmental risk.
Souapiti in Guinea was first proposed during the French colonial period and later studied by Électricité de France in the 1970s and 1990s, with repeated support from the World Bank and AfDB. Despite numerous feasibility studies, the project was never financed—partly due to its massive cost (equivalent to Guinea’s annual GDP at the time) and its displacement implications. In 2018, CHEXIM and China’s Three Gorges financed and constructed the project using many of these legacy designs. The dam ultimately displaced more than 16,000 people, most of them subsistence farmers. Human Rights Watch and International Rivers have documented widespread shortcomings in compensation, consultation and livelihood restoration.
Originally conceived under Dutch colonial rule, Jatigede entered the World Bank pipeline in the 1970s and 1980s. Despite receiving financing for studies and even preliminary resettlement, the project was canceled in 1988 due to persistent concerns over the displacement of more than 40,000 people. In the 2000s, the Indonesian government under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono revived the project with the support of CHEXIM and the contractor Sinohydro. Construction then began in 2008. When the reservoir was filled in 2015, more than 10,000 households were displaced. Survey research (1, 2) conducted in the years since shows severe declines in income and food security among affected communities. The area has also suffered from deforestation and poor water quality.
Rethinking Green Infrastructure
While hydropower projects do reduce reliance on fossil fuels, these case studies illustrate the significant ecological damage, social dislocation and long-term operational risk that large dam projects frequently cause. Moreover, by depending on outdated plans that were not financed at the time they were designed, this research highlights that Chinese financiers are taking on discarded hydropower projects, in addition to failing to align with contemporary environmental and social best practices.
The findings of this working paper indicate that the Belt and Road Initiative’s green credentials will depend on the creation of a forward-looking pipeline of renewable energy projects. Rather than giving new life to fossilized projects, Chinese development banks and firms should invest in upstream project design that incorporates contemporary environmental standards and participatory planning mechanisms. As China pivots away from large-scale overseas lending toward public-private partnerships and foreign direct investment, these lessons remain crucial. Building projects from scratch may be slower and more expensive—but as this research shows, the long-term costs of reviving the past can be far greater.
Read the Working Paper