China-Latin America and the Caribbean Economic Bulletin, 2025 Edition

In 2024, China’s relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) continued to grow, especially in the emerging sectors of renewable energy, energy transition minerals and electric mobility. However, lower-technology sectors such as agriculture and mining continued to dominate trade and are likely to continue their prominent role in trans-Pacific relations.

Rebecca Ray and Enrique Dussel Peters identify these findings in the 2025 edition of the China-Latin America and the Caribbean Economic Bulletin. The report is designed to provide analysts and observers a reference to the ever-changing landscape of China-LAC economic relations—where data is often not readily accessible.

Main findings:

• In 2024, LAC exports to China fell moderately to $190.9 billion, while Chinese exports to LAC grew significantly to an estimated $286.7 billion. Thus, LAC’s trade deficit with China rose to a record 1.4 percent of regional GDP; China now represents 13 percent of LAC’s exports and 22 percent of the region’s imports.
• Among LAC’s top exports to China, raw materials predominate and have grown even more important. For example, refined copper products have declined in importance while unrefined copper ores and concentrates have grown dramatically. Furthermore, frozen beef has grown in importance and replaced refined copper as the fifth most important LAC-China export commodity.
• Chinese contractors’ participation in LAC infrastructure projects has increased dramatically in the last five years, rising by over 50 percent compared to the previous five years. In particular, Chinese firms’ provision of transportation infrastructure has grown to displace energy as the most important sector.
• Chinese outbound slowed slightly from 2020-2024 compared to the previous five years. Nevertheless, Chinese OFDI in sectors associated with climate change has grown rapidly. Within the mining, minerals and metals sector in producing transition minerals (those minerals associated with the global energy transition), Chinese OFDI has more than doubled. Among energy OFDI projects, wind and solar power generation has grown by more than 50 percent. Finally, within automotive manufacturing, most Chinese OFDI has supported manufacturing electric vehicles or a mix of electric and internal combustion rather than simply internal combustion vehicles.
• Chinese overseas development finance (ODF)—sovereign finance from China’s two development finance institutions (DFIs), the China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export-Import Bank of China (CHEXIM)—rose to $2.8 billion in 2024, representing the highest level in five years. It is now roughly on par with the levels just before the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak and well below its peak years from a decade ago.
• Since 2020, almost all of China’s ODF in LAC has gone to the finance and financial intermediaries sector, supporting national development banks in LAC (and particularly Brazil) rather than specific projects. This pivot gives national institutions the role of project selection and oversight.

Recent trends signal the centrality of sustainability in the China-LAC policy engagement. The coming years will determine the important questions of how China and LAC governments can pursue sustainable development together in these agricultural sector as well as in plans to develop renewable energy supply chains. Because of the high concentration in these few sectors, the relationship has encountered increasing trade tensions. The authors argue that the ability and willingness of leaders on both sides of the Pacific to continue working together toward shared development goals will be crucial in the relationship’s future.

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