JD Vance (right) speaking with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (left) as President Donald Trump listens in the Oval Office at the White House, Friday, February 28, 2025. Photo via AP Photo/ Mystyslav Chernov

Politics

POV: Trump Showdown with Zelensky: What Happened? What’s Next?

“Public brawl could have and should have been avoided,” Pardee professor says

The February 28 mash-up in the Oval Office between President Trump and Vice President JD Vance and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was, as Trump commented, “great television.” But it was terrible diplomacy. Trump and Vance roughed up Zelensky and threw him out without lunch. The touted minerals deal that was supposed to be signed that day between the two countries was left unsigned on Trump’s desk.

The public brawl could have and should have been avoided. But it reflected underlying conflicting interests that ultimately could not be swept under the rug.

The United States:

Trump sees US interests in a peace deal that favors Russia. He wants to advance a new trilateral relationship—playing the Russia card against Beijing. Trump may also hope a gusher of Russian hydrocarbons will lower prices at the US pump for his domestic supporters.

His radical reset with Russia—a far cry from then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s more sober 2009 effort—requires a ceasefire largely on Moscow’s terms.

To do so, Trump is delivering eye-popping concessions to Putin. He has tried to place blame on Ukraine for starting the war, which is patently false. At the United Nations, he sided with Russia (and North Korea and other rogues) voting against a resolution that condemned Moscow’s aggression. Even China abstained!

In the Oval Office, Trump and Vance mugged Zelensky to discredit him and justify their craven tilt toward Russia.

Ukraine:

Zelensky is beleaguered, but not broken. He relies on US aid for his war effort and economy. But he also receives more overall support from Europe, as French President Emmanuel Macron made clear to Trump. Zelensky’s overriding goal ahead of last week’s Oval Office meeting was to obtain a reliable security guarantee from Washington—and he was prepared to trade control over future mineral rights in Ukraine to get it.

But, as Zelensky sat in the Oval Office, he knew Trump’s draft accord was missing the key security element. Without that, Zelensky had little interest in signing. He simply could not take home to his constituents a concession to Trump on minerals packaged with a concession to Putin on a ceasefire.

Zelensky deserves admiration for standing up to the bullying by Trump and Vance. He erred diplomatically in letting Vance provoke him. Had he used an interpreter, it would have given him more time to think, cool down, and express himself clearly.

Russia:

Moscow could not be happier. The United States is confounding its European allies, undermining NATO, and trying to issue a January 6–like pardon to Putin. Moscow can just keep its powder dry, perhaps offer some minor concession to Trump, and let the ongoing mess in the West play out.

China:

Ditto. Trump’s legitimization of Putin’s aggression is a convenient predicate for an eventual Beijing takeover of Taiwan, either through force or coercion.

Europe:

Leaders across Europe have hastened to express support for Zelensky. They are beginning to look to themselves as future sustainers of Ukraine if the United States folds its support. 

In the face of Trump’s tilt toward Russia, incoming German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said last week that European leaders must “strengthen Europe as quickly as possible, so that we can achieve independence from the US.”

Perhaps Europe is finally looking to itself for its own security, not out of conviction or convenience, but out of necessity. If Europe can increase aid to Kiev, the Ukrainians can likely hold out for another year or longer, even without US support.

One should not forget that Europe has the economic means to stand up to Russia on its own. Germany’s GDP alone is two and a half times larger than Russia’s. The UK, France, Italy, and Canada all have bigger economies than Russia. It is not a close call if Europe has the political will to make the defense investment.

What next? Interests suggest that the United States may need to lean back toward Ukraine if Trump wants to get the ceasefire he seeks. Trump said that Ukraine had no cards in this game, but it is likely Trump who overplayed his hand.

Ukraine has interests, too, in trying to patch up relations with Washington to keep aid flowing, if possible, and manage relations with European allies who do not seek a full break with Washington—even if they feel compelled to prepare for the worst. But Zelensky will not agree to a one-sided peace that is a prelude to further Russian aggression.

Just 40 days into his second term, Trump has done lasting damage to Western solidarity. He may have thought he could retain US influence in Europe while cutting US security commitments to the continent. Or that he could build valuable trust with Putin that he can later count on. Or that his shameful behavior would be without consequences and produce a peace and even the Nobel Peace Prize he covets.

But one could not ignore the bust of Churchill peering over Trump’s shoulder in the Oval Office meeting and had to wonder if it was whispering into Trump’s ear Churchill’s famous admonition about appeasing dictators: “You were given the choice between war and dishonor. You chose dishonor and you will have war.”

Mark C. Storella is a Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies professor of the practice of diplomacy. He was a US foreign service officer for over three decades and US ambassador to Zambia from 2010 to 2013. He can be reached at mcs32@bu.edu. 

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