THE COLD WAR AND THE WEST
45
From the standpoint of the other participants in the symposium,
this whole argument may perhaps read like a lengthy digression
from the real topic, viz., how "the West" can improve its international
posture. I believe on the contrary that it
is
central to the theme,
once it
is
realized that "the West" is made up of two unequal halves,
with military predominance vested in the only part of the North
Atlantic world which can conceivably survive a full-scale nuclear
war. There is now- perhaps for the first time-a tendency among
Americans to lean on Europe, possibly even to exaggerate the strength
of Europe. This may be a sign of flagging self-confidence, or simply
of greater maturity. In any case it does not relieve the United States
of the burden of working out a global policy which makes sense to
the uncommitted countries. It is all very well to ask what "the West"
can do, but we
all
know that nothing effective will be done unless
the USA gives the lead, or at any rate makes it possible for a lead
to be given and then places its weight behind it. What that lead
should be is a matter for debate among those who (like the writer
of these lines) still hope, though with diminishing confidence, that
the worst can be averted. We are here talking about
political
choices:
it may be assumed that, were Europe to be lost, the United States
would transform itself into a military fortress (probably with an
authoritarian form of government ) and prepare for the inevitable.
As
long as we have not reached this point, we may as well allow our
minds to roam more or less freely over the available political alterna–
tives. A few rather obvious considerations suggest themselves to an
observer who is not bound by the traditional liberal pieties. For
brevity's sake they may be listed in the form of brief recommenda–
tions, leaving the intellectual background to take care of itself:
1) Work for a form of Atlantic Union, without renouncing
the ultimate aim of world government through the United Nations.
In the
long run,
the latter
is
the only rational aim, but before we
get there, "the West" will have to work out common institutions
limited to the Atlantic world, i.e., Western Europe and North
America, plus such other entrants as may from time to time qualify
for membership. (Clearly there is room for argument as to what
parts of the Latin American and/or Mediterranean worlds should
be regarded as eligible).
2) Assume that in the
long run
the East-West conflict will lose
