THE COLD WAR AND THE WEST
43
and America will continue to see eye to eye. At any rate a contributor
who happens to be located on the European side of the Atlantic must
make it plain that he has a special stake in the avoidance of global
war.
As
was recently noted by C. P. Snow in a somewhat similar
context, people in Britain-and the same is true of all other West
European countries, and very possibly of the East European ones
too-cannot afford to regard nuclear war as an instrument of policy:
they are too keenly aware that, if fought on a larger than merely
tactical scale, it would mean the end of their particular habitat.
This has nothing to do with neutralism or pacifism, though it may
become a stimulus of both; it is simply a recognition of the facts.
Nor is it a party matter. There is no difference on this score between
Sir Charles Snow and General de Gaulle, although the former is
probably more likely to draw the conclusion that the European
nation-state no longer corresponds to modem military and techno–
logical realities. That Europe is in danger of being reduced to ashes
in a war between the two colossi of East and West, is common
ground among people of the most varied political views. Mter all
it was de Gaulle who some time ago publicly observed that
all
European countries might in a future war be devastated by their
respective nuclear "protectors."
To say this is not to dispute that "the West" is a reality; merely
to remind Americans that they cannot take the military and political
partnership of Western Europe for granted, any more than the
Kremlin can rely on the readiness of East European statesmen to
stake the existence of their countries in all circumstances. At the
moment such considerations are overlaid and masked by the Berlin
issue and the wider problem of Germany. They will inevitably come
to the forefront if-as seems likely- the German problem is tempor–
arily settled on the basis of tacit recognition by the West of the
territorial .and political status quo. Leaving aside the question whether
such a settlement-which need not take the form of a new "Munich"
visible to all concerned-may not result in a gradual but permanent
demoralization of Germany and Western Europe generally, it seems
likely that once the tension has abated, there will be a renewed effort
on the part at least of the Continental European governments (the
"Six") to make sure that in any future hypothetical conflict between
the USA and the USSR, .Europe does not become the principal
