GEORGE LlCHTHEIM
battleground. It is at least arguable that in this context some form
of military (not political) disengagement may look attractive to
both sides. By 1970 Western Europe is likely to have achieved some
form of political union, together with an unprecedented degree of
economic development and prosperity, and a modest capacity for
atomic retaliation (though hardly for effective defense or protection
of its populations). It will then assume the aspect of an extremely
valuable, and at the same time highly vulnerable, prize for the
prospective winner of a global war. Since the European nation–
state (or even the whole of Europe combined) is no longer able to
participate fully in a conflict between the super-powers (not being
built
a
l'echelle nucUaire),
the temptation to "contract out" will
probably mount
pari passu
with the presumptive readiness of the
true world powers to spare Europe the horrors of a nuclear devasta–
tion which would smash the coveted prize of global victory. It is at
any rate conceivable that the Russians, if not the Chinese, might
concur in such an appreciation. But if this is so-and European
political leaders would be foolish as well as unpatriotic if they did
not bank on such a chance--can one really talk of "the West" as a
political unity? Must one not at least grant that even within the
hypothetical Atlantic Union of the 1970's and 1980's, Western
Europe will tend to pursue certain primary aims of its own, among
which the aim of self-preservation will come increasingly to take
first place?
Nothing that has been said so far constitutes any reason why
Americans and West Europeans should not try to find common
ground in respect of the overriding problem of
averting
nuclear war.
But here the primary responsibility lies with the United States, while
the consequences of failure are likely to be of mortal significance
chiefly to Europe. This is merely another way of saying that Europe
looks to America to prevent the outbreak of global war if possible, and
if it is not possible, to refrain from treating Europe as a battlefield.
It may be that the Europeans have no moral grounds for demanding
to be placed in a relatively privileged position; but the conviction
that atomic war, while not necessarily fatal to the USA or the Soviet )
Union, must be fatal to them, cannot fail to determine their political
behavior in the years ahead. It is merely common sense to recognize
this and build one's expectations upon it.
