42
GEORGE LICHTHEIM
At this stage I doubt that either East or West is seriously inter–
ested
in
disannament. The grandiose proposals and counter-proposals
are intended as window-dressing or propaganda, and the moment an
offer is seen to be acceptable it is modified or withdrawn.
If
we con–
tinue to seek the perfect fonnula or to demand perfect security,
nothing of any consequence is likely to happen. I should welcome,
to begin with, the most modest of agreements, even of only token
significance, in a timed and progressive series of accomodations. The
important thing is to set the machinery of disannament into motion,
no matter at what level. Why should not peace have its escalation as
well as war? There will never be a better chance--in fact, there may
never be another chance-to stop nuclear testing in the atmosphere.
If
we proceed with our intention to resume atmospheric testing, we
shall not escape responsibility for the consequences by continuing to
point an accusing finger at Khrushchev.
Do the issues at stake justify a nuclear war? Only if you believe
that the way to defend a civilization is to destroy it. How many
millions, how many hundreds of millions, must be killed in order to
prove a folly? History, said Hegel, repeats itself twice-first as tragedy,
then as farce.
GEORGE L1CHTHEIM
With a typically generous disregard for national frontiers
and traditional vested interests, the Editors of
PR
invite a selected
list of contributors to discuss "the position of the West in the cold
war." It is tacitly assumed that Americans and Europeans share a
common interest in the defense of the West, and moreover that Europe
and America are equal partners in fighting the cold war. Else why
should it be taken for granted that differences of opinion over the
best strategy to be pursued will cut across national frontiers? This
confidence is praiseworthy, but a trifle question-begging. The prob–
lem outlined by the organizers of the symposium-how to win the
cold war-cannot be divorced from the question whether Europe:
