THE COLD WAR AND THE WEST
55
intervention, the economic and technological life of another nation?
More specifically, in terms of the political objective of keeping the
uncommitted nations uncommitted, how is one to create that positive
relationship in the mind of the recipient between the aid and its
beneficial results, and the political philosophy, system, and objectives
of the giver? As long as the recipient disapproves of the politics of
the giver, the political effects of the aid are lost. These effects are
similarly lost as long as the recipient remains unconvinced that the
aid received is but a natural manifestation of the politics of the
giver. Foreign aid, then, remains politically ineffective as long as
the recipient says either, "aid is good, but the politics of the giver
are bad," or "aid is good, but the politics of the giver have nothing
to do
with
it."
Questions such as these require policies of extraordinary subtlety
and intricacy to answer them. The simple correlation between foreign
aid and what the United States desires in the uncommitted nations
could not provide the answers. That correlation is a projection of
the domestic experience of America onto the international scene.
Capital formation and investment and technological innovation creat–
ed the wealth and prosperity of America, and, so
it
was assumed, the
export of American capital and technology into the underdeveloped
nations would bring forth similar results there. The similarity be–
tween this and the Wilsonian expectation is striking. Wilson wanted
to bring the peace and order of America to the rest of the world by
exporting its democratic institutions. His contemporary heirs wanted
to bring the wealth and prosperity of America to the rest of the
world through the export of American capital and technology. Yet
while the failure of the Wilsonian experiment was quick and drastical–
ly revealed, the failure of foreign aid, simplistically conceived, has
been less obvious, albeit no less drastic.
The United States must start thinking of foreign aid not as a
self-sufficient technical enterprise but as a political weapon to be
applied to a great variety of situations with great subtlety and
sophistication. The first prerequisite for the development of a viable
philosophy of foreign aid is the recognition of the diversity of policies
that go by that name. At least six such policies can be distinguished
which have only one thing in common: the transfer of money and
economic services from one nation to another. They are humanitarian
