THE COLD WAR AND THE WEST
41
war cold
is
that it
is
being waged on fairly even terms; the moment
when a decisive advantage
is
gained is the very moment when it will
be converted, by the side that refuses humiliation, into a hot war.
I do not subscribe to a Manichean view of world politics. Al–
though I am often repelled and sometimes outraged by Soviet policy
and practice, my assumption is that the Communist State is neither
hopel~ly
irrational nor irretrievably committed to evil. How can
those who argue otherwise have any faith whatever in the possibility
of a peaceful settlement of our differences? Nothing in the historic
situation supports the contention that we are engaged in a cosmic
struggle between the forces of light and the forces of darkness. The
state
is
a changing system whose only constant is self-interest. From
the spectacular reshuffling of partners after World War II we should
have learned that neither friends nor enemies wear permanent labels.
To be sure, we have ideological differences with the USSR, but let
us keep in mind that when it has seemed to our advantage, as in our
relationship with Spain and Portugal and certain Latin-American
dictatorships, we have been ready to discount or ignore the differ–
ences. Both East and West tend to overstress their ideological differ–
ences in an effort to provide a quasi-religious sanction for their tradi–
tional power struggle-outmoded now in the sense that it can no
longer be fought to a decision within the comparative security of a
closed war.
The real revolution in the affairs of the great powers is that war
has become a total weapon no longer suitable for the achievement
of limited ends. Nations that rattle rockets these days do so in the
persuasion that since war has become unthinkable they can resort
with impunity to the threat of war. The risk, which is compounded
daily, lies in the probability that the illusion will be detonated into
reality as the result of accident, miscalculation, or sheer hysteria:.
Faced with this predicament, the part of statesmanship is to play
firmly for time while striving for a relaxation of tensions. Americans
should welcome the stabilization of the Russian economy, for only
then will its more repressive and aggressive features be ameliorated.
If
we can refrain from blowing each other to bits in the near future,
it is by no means preposterous to anticipate a gradual rapprochement
leading to an alliance by the end of the century that will be posed as
a counterweight to the massive force of China.
