Bad experiment in S. End
Boston Herald
August 30, 2008
By Laura Maslow-Armand and Daniel Goodenough
Although the proponents of the BU biolab claim that the possibility of an accidental release is negligible, their assessment of risk was judged to be not credible by National Resource Council experts.
Bruce Ivins’ painful story sheds light on a more important issue – the unregulated and unnecessary multiplication of high-risk biological laboratories throughout the United States.
In these facilities, research will be conducted on Ebola, Marburg, the 1918 pandemic flu, SARS viruses and other deadly agents. There is no federal oversight and no mandatory reporting of accidents. In fact, a number of laboratories have policies against such reporting.
In the wake of the anthrax letters, the National Institutes of Health has spent more than $1 billion to construct new biological laboratories – BioSafety Level 3 and 4. According to the Government Accountability Office, no single government agency knows how many BioSafety laboratories are operating in the United States or their locations.
We do know, however, that there are currently 15 BioSafety Level 4 facilities either operational or under construction, designed for research on the most dangerous pathogens known to mankind. Ed Hammond, director of The Sunshine Project, determined that those 15 BSL4 facilities, lined up in a row, would occupy nearly 90 acres of floor space, or the equivalent of 36 typical big-box stores.
One of these Level 4 laboratories, funded with $189 million of National Institutes of Health funds that might have been devoted to our current public health needs, has already been constructed in Boston. Without justification or even rational explanation, this facility has been located in a predominantly minority neighborhood, already burdened with ill health and a disproportionate number of environmental hazards.
Were it not for a determined coalition of community activists, scientists and pro bono attorneys, that laboratory might have opened two years ago. Although the proponents of the Boston University biolab claim that the possibility of an accidental release is negligible, their assessment of risk was judged to be “not credible” by a panel of scientific experts convened by the National Resource Council.
Consider the risk of transporting deadly pathogens from one lab to another through congested streets by UPS or Federal Express carriers. When BU officials were pressed for further details on the training and protection of those carriers, they responded by saying that there will always be two drivers in every truck.
Consider the risk of attempting to reliably screen new laboratory workers who will be hired for that facility.
BU officials, as reassurance, asserted that future lab technicians will undergo criminal background and drug abuse checks.
Would those procedures weed out a disaffected worker or one with hostile intent? The policy calls for self-reporting of one’s personal problems.
But no one sounded the alarm when Dr. Ivins, with unfettered access to virulent strains of anthrax, admitted to being paranoid and delusional.
Consider further the risk of human error, inattention and negligence. BU tries to downplay this factor by saying that there will be a “buddy system,” where lab technicians, working two by two, will watch each other. Such mutual supervision is illusory since competitive pressure and the need for intense concentration would prevent anyone from even trying to be his brother’s keeper.
The nation is just waking up to these dangers. Michigan Rep. Bart Stupak concluded, after a hearing in October 2007, that it may be only a matter of time before we have a public health incident with potentially catastrophic results. Exposing the residents of Roxbury and the South End to this unnecessary risk is nothing more than environmental racism.
Laura Maslow-Armand is staff attorney at the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law. Daniel Goodenough is Takeda Professor of cell biology at the Harvard Medical School.