The Allure of Battle

Historian Cathal J. Nolan shows we’ve gotten a lot wrong about war—with bloody consequences

 

Some of the worst misconceptions about war can be traced to the time of Napoleon, according to historian Cathal J. Nolan. Horace Vernet Bataille de Wagram, 6 Juillet 1809, Palace of Versailles/Wikimedia Commons

World leaders have long been captivated by stories of decisive battles, of generals whose brilliance can overcome overwhelming odds. But these clashes and leaders are rarely as important as military theorists and popular culture would have us believe, says historian Cathal J. Nolan. Lavishing attention on them “cheapens the real history and study of war—and leads you to false conclusions of how to wage and actually win wars,” says Nolan. In his new book, The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost (Oxford University Press, 2017), Nolan aims to change how we view war—and help nations think twice before rushing into unnecessary, drawn-out conflicts.

The worst misconceptions about war date to Napoleonic times, says Nolan. In the book, he shows how the study of leaders like Frederick the Great and Napoleon—whose battle-centric approach sparked a veneration of aggressive tactics—became a key part of officer training, while historians and the media churned out exciting stories about their maneuvers and supposedly pivotal battles. Stalingrad is often described as a turning point of World War II, says Nolan, an associate professor of history and executive director of the International History Institute, but “the Second World War was so big it didn’t have a turning point; it had multiple.” It might have been a major defeat for the Germans, but what “Stalingrad basically did was accelerate the rates of attrition.”

What Nolan calls the “short-war delusion” is also a problem. The idea that “you can cut the Gordian knots of politics and ideology and economic competition or whatever it is that is leading you to this contest, through a quick and decisive battle” is appealing. It gives a small nation hope of defeating a larger one, and it helps governments rally popular support. But it’s also misguided.

“In the modern period, in almost every case, this has led to protracted wars of exhaustion,” he says. “Almost everyone has been wrong that the war will be short, and the reason for that is straightforward. Modern wars don’t simply engage armies, they engage whole societies and they engage the passions of whole societies. Once you spill blood, once you spend treasure, it changes everything.”

“Active, serving, senior military officers engaged in the wars in Afghanistan and in the Middle East are very much aware that they’re fighting a new thirty years’ war of attrition, even a new hundred years’ war.”
—Cathal J. Nolan

After the first few weeks or battles of a war—such as in World War I, says Nolan—it’s sometimes the case that “the reason for which countries fight is to justify all of the blood that was spilled.” Major powers then grind each other down. “Then eventually one falls down—usually just before the other one’s about to.”

Despite the facts, the allure of battle endures. “The most recent American short-war delusion,” says Nolan, “was the race to Baghdad in 2003, and we’re still there.” This isn’t lost on the US military. “From the responses I’ve had in private,” he says, “active, serving, senior military officers engaged in the wars in Afghanistan and in the Middle East are very much aware that they’re fighting a new Thirty Years’ War of attrition, even a new Hundred Years’ War, and they’re trying to adjust their operational doctrine and their strategic approach to take this into account.”

Since publishing The Allure of Battle, Nolan has spoken at the US Army’s Com­mand and General Staff College, a military think tank, and to a congressional book club, as well as in more traditional academic venues. Among the lessons shared: It’s entire armies and societies, not individual generals, that win conflicts. And don’t fall for talk of a short war; it’s probably going to be a long, tough slog.

“You have to then ask yourself a basic question,” he says. “What wars are actually worth that absolutely appalling, long-term, national commitment and human cost, and the answer will be ‘not that many.’ So be more careful with ones you get into, as it’s much harder to get out.”