552
PARTISAN REVIEW
JOHN PIKE: I think that the difficulties of this strategy suggest
themselves. I'm not here to argue the merits of it, but I assert without
fear of well-grounded contradiction that that is our strategy today.
H. J. KAPLAN: I'm astounded to hear you say what you've just said
because I spent some time in our NATO mission in Brussels, and I
don't think that I'm being indiscreet or giving away any secrets here.
I cannot remember a time - unless this happened in the last few years
- when the notion of using ICBMs based in this country tactically
would ever....
JOHN PIKE: It's not a question of tactical use. It's use against Other
Military Targets deep inside the Soviet homeland, such as airfields
and supply depots .
H. J. KAPLAN: I mean less than an all out nuclear war, which in–
volves protecting, and expending those nuclear assets, fixed nuclear
assets, before they were attacked by anybody else. I'm simply as–
tounded to hear that the use of these weapons in the kind of situation
we're talking about is part of our flexible response strategy . This
would mean taking the limited number of land missiles, and using
them on marshalling yards, as you say, and refineries, and so forth.
That was never conceived of. When we first worked out war plans
and scenarios, which had a considerable durability, there was never
any conception of that. It was always assumed that the use of
ICBMs on either side implied necessarily the all out full offensive .
JOHN PIKE: Well there is now and has been since PD 59 in 1979.
GEORGE CHAPLINE: It's my understanding that the reason that
we have changed our targeting policy is that we don't really under–
stand what it is that deters the Soviet leadership. And the reasoning
that I've heard that went into part of the motivation for allowing
the possibility for targeting Soviet military installations in particular
(marshalling yards and barracks and so forth), was that it was
thought that the Soviet Army - the Army in particular as opposed to
other branches of the Soviet military - had an enormous amount of
influence in the Soviet Politburo , and therefore we would effectively
increase our deterrent by targeting things that the Army in par–
ticular valued. We're not sure that if we destroyed Kiev, or maybe
even Moscow, the Soviet leaders might not find that acceptable.
Suppose they evacuated Moscow? I've heard this from people very
high up in the Pentagon.
JOHN PIKE: It would also deny the Soviet Army a plausible theory
of victory, because you would be denying them all of Category II
and Category III reinforcements. They'd have to go with the
