"STAR WARS": THE POLITICS OF DEFENSE
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JOHN PIKE: Whereas in a situation where both sides have
deployed leaky defenses the side that strikes first could significantly
limit damage from retaliation .
LIONEL ABEL: You're implying that there would be an inequality
of power if there were leaky defenses on both sides and you are also
saying that there is an equality of power if neither side has any
defenses . I don't understand that . I would think there'd be an in–
equality of power if one side had a better leaky defense, but not if
both had leaky defenses.
JOHN PIKE: No.
DANIEL ROSE: Can I ask Dr. Chapline to comment on the leaky,
less-than-perfect defense?
GEORGE CHAPLINE: I'm not aware of any rigorous arguments
that if one side had a leaky defense and the other didn't , that would
increase the probability of nuclear war. And I would be completely
comfortable with the United States having a defense system and the
Soviet Union not having one . Now, of course, if we deployed a leaky
defense system, or a system of any kind, the Soviet Union is not go–
ing to stand still, and they probably will deploy one of their own .
And that would tend to return one to the sa.-called equilibrium situ–
ation where neither side had an advantage. The point which Mr.
Pike and the critics have often made is that now there is an equilib–
rium, in the sense that neither side has an incentive to go first,
whereas they refer to the situation where one side has an incentive to
go first, and I don't disagree with that , as destabilizing: But what I'm
saying is that that's a very prejudicial term because I know of abso–
lutely no argument to prove that in such a situation the probability
of nuclear war is significantly higher.
JOHN PIKE: In the literature it's known as the "clever briefer" prob–
lem. The question is: in a time of very profound crisis , greater than
anything that's been experienced in the nuclear era, would a "clever
briefer" be able to approach his leadership and offer a plausible theory
of victory? Would a "clever briefer" be able to present a proposal to
their leadership as to why they should initiate nuclear war? Now it's
true that fortunately since we don't have any empirical data on how
nuclear wars get started, it's very difficult to establish rigorously why
a war does or does not occur. But within the literature, or the folklore,
one of the standard problems, that you have to look at when you're
trying to figure out whether you are doing the right thing is this ques–
tion : the leadership is sitting down there in the bunker, and they
have been up for the last thirty-six hours, and they've been drinking
