"STAR WARS": THE POLITICS OF DEFENSE
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more, thanks to Mr. Nixon. The Soviets also have to contend with
the fact that virtually everything of value and certainly almost every–
thing of interest in the Soviet Union is in Moscow. Moscow is an ex–
tremely attractive target, both for third nuclear forces and for the
United States in a decapitating leadership attack.
BARRY BELGOROD: I find the concept of deriding a nuclear
defense somewhat contrary to American ethics . In our country we
supposedly value human life above all else. It seems to me that if we
could save ten percent of the United States population in a nuclear
fallout, or nuclear attack, that's something worth doing.
JOHN PIKE: Unfortunately in order to save ten percent of the pop–
ulation you have to have a nuclear war and deploying the defense
system makes the war more likely. Over the last twenty years the
United States has been faced with a number of different choices
about what type of strategic forces we deploy. There's always a trade–
off between the effectiveness of those forces if they are used, and the
risk that those weapons pose as to whether or not they will be used.
And quite consistently, the American political system has decided
that if we are faced with a weapons system that would improve the
outcome of a war, at the risk of increasing the risk of the war, that we
would not deploy that weapons system. I think that the MX is an ex–
cellent example.
If
we had deployed one hundred MXs, or pick your
number , in soft Minuteman silos, that would significantly reduce
damage to the United States in the event of World War III. We
might be able to reduce American fatalities from 160 million dead to
perhaps 120 million dead. On the other hand, because those ICBM
silos would be extremely vulnerable in a time of crisis their
vulnerability would significantly increase Soviet incentives to pre–
emptively attack those silos to destroy them.
GEORGE CHAPLINE: Mr. Pike made one assumption that I
strongly disagree with, that deploying defensive systems will increase
the likelihood of nuclear war. As far as I'm aware, no one under–
stands what it is that determines the probability of nuclear war.
Hence, it seems to me impossible to determine or to show rigorously
that deploying defensive systems will increase the likelihood of nu–
clear war. I agree that if one side had a defense and the other side
didn't, the side that had the defense would have some incentive to
strike first. But I know of no rigorous argument that would, in the
real world , increase the likelihood of nuclear war.
JOHN PIKE: Fortunately, our database on nuclear wars is quite
limited . I'm interested in keeping it that way .
