NOAM CHOMSKY
ground to the Soviets, a matter which indirectly affected Vietnam.
Anything, anywhere, that "was, or could be interpreted to be a weak
U.S. response, only strengthened the pressure to hold on in Viet–
nam." Chester Cooper believes, however, that "Kennedy's foreign
policy stance was given an added fillip in late 1962 following his
dramatic success" in the Cuban missile crisis. Vietnam then pro–
vided an opportunity to prove to Peking and Moscow that their
policy of "wars of liberation" was dangerous and unpromising, and
also "provided both a challenge and an opportunity to test the new
doctrines" of counterinsurgency.
It
would appear, then, that whether
the U.S. stance with respect to its great power rival is defensive or
not, the determination to win in Indochina is fortified.
By early 1964, concern over the effects of the "loss" of South
Vietnam reached a peak of what can perhaps properly be called
"hysteria." In the analyst's phrase, referring to the February delibera–
tions, "stopping Hanoi from aiding the Viet Cong virtually became
equated with protecting U.S. interests against the threat of insurgen–
cy throughout the world" (III, 153 ) . Ralph Stavins hardly exag–
gerates (in
Washington Plans an Aggressive War)
when he describes
the "clouds on the horizon" as seen from Washington in the early
1960s: "Hanoi would overthrow Diem with a few guerrilla bands,
and the United States, as a direct consequence, would be forced to
retire from the arena of world politics." Such fears were incorporated
into the important National Security Agency Memorandum 288 of
March 1964, which presented what the analyst calls "a classic state–
ment of the domino theory" (III, 3). Throughout the world, it held,
"the South Vietnam conflict is regarded as a test case of U.S. ca–
pacity to help a nation to meet the Communist 'war of liberation'.
Thus, purely in terms of foreign policy, the stakes are high...." The
memorandum stated in clear terms that "we seek an independent
non-Communist South Vietnam" free to accept outside - meaning
American - assistance, including "police and military help to root
out and control insurgent elements." And it stated that unless we
can achieve this objective, "almost all of Southeast Asia will probably
fall under Communist dominance" or "accommodate to Commu–
nism," with an increased threat to India, Australia, Japan and
indeed, throughout the world, given that the conflict is a "test case"
(III, 50-1; II, 459-61). Although these views were modulated later
on
(ct.
III, 220, 658), the essential idea of South Vietnam as a
