Vol. 39 No. 3 1972 - page 337

PARTISAN REVIEW
337
well be contagious. The problem is what Walt Rostow and others
sometimes call the "ideological threat," specifically, "the possibility
that the Chinese Communists can' prove to Asians by progress in
China that Communist methods are better and faster than demo–
cratic methods." The State Department feared that "a fundamental
source of danger we face in the Far East derives from Communist
China's rate of economic growth which will probably continue to
outstrip that of free Asian countries, with the possible exception of
Japan," a matter of real as well as psychological impact elsewhere.
1
The Joint Chiefs of Staff repeated the same wording two weeks later
(DOD,
book 10,
1213),
adding further that "the dramatic economic
improvements realized by Communist China over the past ten years
impress the nations of the region greatly and offer a serious chal–
lenge to the Free World"
(1226).
The State Department therefore
urged that the United States do what it can to retard the economic
progress of the Communist Asian States
( 1208),
a decision that is
remarkable in its cruelty.
A few years later, in the midst of the fall
1964
planning to
es–
calate the war, Michael Forrestal pointed out that we must be con–
cerned with Chinese "ideological expansion," its need "to achieve
ideological successes abroad" and the danger that any such ideological
success will stimulate the need for further successes. Therefore "our
objective should be to 'contain' China for the longest possible pe–
riod";2 or, as the analyst puts it a bit more accurately, paraphrasing
Forrestal, "the U.S. object should be to 'contain' Chinese political
and ideological influence" (III,
218).
William Sullivan picked up
the same theme, viewing "Chinese political and ideological aggres–
siveness ... as a threat to the ability of these peoples to determine
their own futures, and hence to develop along ways compatible with
United States interests"
(ibid.,
analyst'S paraphrase).
Note the typical assumption that self-determination is equivalent
to United States interest, an assumption that is more than usually
United States- Vietnam Relations,
1945-1967, Book
W,
1198; June 1959:
the government offset edition of the Pentagon Papers. All
DOD
references
are from this edition.
2
Gravel Edition of the Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History
of
u.s.
Decisionmaking on Vietnam,
Beacon Press, 1971, III, 592; Novem–
ber 4, 1964. References hereafter are to this edition except where otherwise
noted.
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