342
NOAM CHOMSKY
shall have suffered a major political rout the repercussions of which
will be felt throughout the rest of the world, especially in the Middle
East and in a then critically exposed Australia."
The general lines of this analysis persist through the Truman
and Eisenhower administrations. NSC/64 ( I, 36lf.) concluded
that Thailand and Burma would "fall under Communist dom–
ination" and the rest of Southeast Asia would
be
"in grave
hazard," if Indochina were "controlled by a Communist-dominated
government." The Joint Chiefs urged "long-term measures to pro–
vide for Japan and the other offshore islands a secure source of
food and other strategic materials from non-Communist held areas
in the Far East" (I, 366, April 1950; they also recommended mili–
tary aid and covert operations). A State Department Policy Com–
mittee interpreted NSC/64 as asserting that "the loss of Indo–
china to Communist forces would undoubtedly lead to the loss
of Southeast Asia"
(DOD)
book 8, 351; October 1950 ) . NSC
48/5 saw the USSR as attempting to bring the mainland of
East Asia and eventually Japan under Soviet control (May 1951;
425f. ) . Glven Asian population, military capacity, critical resources
and Japanese industrial capacity, it is essential to block this program.
An NSC
s~aff
study of February 1952 warned that
the fall of Southeast Asia would underline the apparent economic
advantages to Japan of association with the communist-dominated
Asian sphere. Exclusion of Japan from trade with Southeast Asia
would seriously affect the Japanese economy, and increase Japan's
dependence on United States aid. In the long run the loss of South–
east Asia, especially Malaya and Indonesia, could result in such
economic and political pressures in Japan as to make it extremely
difficult to prevent J apan's eventual accommodation to the Soviet
Bloc.
[I,
375]
It
went on to speak of the importance of Southeast Asian raw ma–
terials
(e.g.)
Indonesian oil and the significance of Malaya, the larg–
est dollar earner of the United Kingdom, to Britain's economic re–
covery), and U.S. strategic interests, developing the domino theory
in detail.
NSC 124/2 in June 1952 identified China as the main enemy,
and gave a clear formulation of the domino theory, emphasizing
again the problem of raw materials and the threat of Japanese ac–
commodation to Communism ( I, 83-4, 384f.). The same themes
persist, with added and even clearer emphasis, under the Eisenhower
administration.
It
was emphasized that Japan is the keystone of U.S.
