PARTISAN REVIEW
339
a "Vietnamese-negotiated deal" led to a unified Communist Vietnam,
hostile to Communist China and limiting its ambitions to Laos and
Cambodia (the "most likely result" of the least aggressive option
they were considering), then "whether the rot spread to Thailand
would be hard to judge." It would, however, be " likely that the
Thai .. . would accommodate somehow to Communist China even
without any marked military move by Communist China" (III, 661 ).
The "rot" in these cases is, surely, the "ideological threat." Recall
that in this period there was much talk of a competition between
the Chinese and Indian models of development. In this context, fear
of Chinese "ideological expansion" gave substance to the domino
theory, quite apart from any fantasies about Chinese troops roam–
ing at will through northern Thailand or Kremlin-directed aggression
by the Viet Minh.
It
is important to be clear about what is at stake in discussion
of the domino theory and related matters. The reality of perceived
"dangers" is, of course, irrelevant to determining the motivation of
policy-makers. The fact that threats were perceived and taken serious–
ly suffices to establish a motive. The question of the reality of the
threats is nevertheless of interest, for a different reason.
If
in fact a
failure of intelligence or knowledge led to the perception of imaginary
dangers, as is often alleged, then policy could be "improved" (for
whose benefit, is another question ) by replacing the policy-makers
by others who are more rational and knowledgeable. The issues are
sometimes not kept separate, with much resulting confusion.
Perhaps the threat has now diminished, with the vast destruction
in South Vietnam and the hatreds and social disruption caused by
the American war. It may be, then, that Vietnam can be lost to
the
Vietname~e
without the dire consequence of rapid social and
economic progress. Perhaps the "second line of defense" of which
United States planners spoke can be held, at least for a time.
If
our friends - Diem, Chiang, Sarit and Ayub, in 1961-
were toppled by popular movements, perhaps ultimately leading
Japan to realign, influencing India, affecting even the oil-rich Middle
East and then Europe, as the domino theory postulated, there would
be a serious imp::tct on the global system dominated by the United
States and U.S.-based international corporations. Although some of
the formulations of the domino theory were indeed
f~ntastic,
the
underlying concept was no fantasy. Correspondingly, it comes as
