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and Chile, Guatemala for the past two decades, the Dominican Re–
public in 1965 and so on, there can
be
little doubt as to the con–
clusion of such an investigation. Gordon Connel-Smith, in
The Inter–
American System,
a study by no means hostile to U.S. policy, puts
the matter in terms that seem quite adequate: " ...United States
concern for representative democracy in Latin America is a facet of
her anti-communist policy." He goes on to say:
There has been no serious question of her intervening in the case
of the many right-wing military coups, from which, of course, this
policy generally has benefited. It is only when her own concept of
democracy, closely identified with private, capitalistic enterprise,
is threatened by communism that she has felt impelled to demand
collective action to defend it.
It
may be argued, with justice, that this view is no more than
a first approximation to an understanding of foreign policy, and
omits many second-order considerations. Thus it would not be correct
to claim that formation of foreign policy is in the interests of a
monolithic corporate elite. On the contrary, there are conflicting
interests. But we would expect to find, and do find, that those inter–
ests that are particularly concerned with foreign policy are well rep–
resented in foreign policy formation. By similar dynamics, regulatory
agencies tend to fall into the hands of industries that are particularly
concerned with their decisions. It is, furthermore, no doubt true that
at some point ideology takes on a motive force of its own. There are
other interacting, and for the most part mutually supportive factors:
the interest of the "state management" in the Pentagon in enhancing
its -own power; the role of government-induced production of rap–
idly-obsolescing luxury goods (largely military) as a technique of
economic management, with-a resulting need to secure strategic raw
materials; the usefulness of an external enemy as a device to whip
the taxpayer into line, in support of the production of waste and
the costs of empire; the heady sense of power, to which academic
ideologues in particular seem to succumb so readily. Such factors as
these produce a fairly stable system to support the basic imperial drive,
which is second nature to the men of power in the state executive
in any event. There are many specific factors
tha~
must
be
considered
in a detailed examination of particular decisions, such as those that
led us ever more deeply into Indochina. Nevertheless, it seems reason–
ably clear that American policy, like that of any great power,
is
guided by the "national interest" as conceived by dominant social
