COEXISTENCE AND IDEOLOGY
219
Chinese Communist regime. But the present situation can go on
without change for years. Peking can scarcely
recognize
the fact of
the
Nationalist regime in Formosa, and Washington cannot sacrifice
the
latter, nor deny its legitimacy, as long as it exists.
* * *
Is Western unity today more fragile, more threatened, than it
has
been in the past? Three factors--independent of each other but
with cumulative effects- have given rise to the rather widespread feel–
ing on both sides of the Atlantic that the Alliance is on the point of
disintegrating: the present weakness of the Republican administration
and of President Eisenhower himself, the progress of Soviet tech–
nology and military power, and the ill-disguised hostility of Wash–
ington and London towards French policy in North Mrica.
How long can the Alliance hold together in the absence of
effective leadership? It is difficult to say. Personally, I tend
to
be–
lieve that alliances between democratic countries are stronger than
they
seem. Their weaknesses are more visible than their factors of
strength, but in the long run it is the latter that prevail. The majority
of European statesmen are convinced that no alternative policy can
afford as much security as the Atlantic Pact and NATO. This pro–
position is less obviously true in the era of ballistic weapons than
in the era of American invulnerability; nevertheless, it remains true.
In Europe the Alliance can, with difficulty, arrive at a common
policy with respect to the Soviet Union. Elsewhere
in
the world
this
is
not the case. In the Middle East, the policies of the Western coun–
tries diverge, not so much because their interests are contradictory
as
because the responsible officials-whether in Washington, London,
or Paris-are incapable of defining an Arab policy. Each government
lives from day to day, reacting to events as best it can. London clings
to
the Baghdad Pact and tries to keep control over the Arab prince–
doms
of the Arabian peninsula. Washington tries to appease Arab
nationalism without sacrificing the sovereigns. This pragmatism is
perhaps inevitable, but it is not conducive to coordination. In Mrica,
the
American and British governments have too little faith in the
IUccessful outcome of French policy
in
Algeria to support it; nor can
they
oppose it without setting forth an alternative policy. Being
in
doubt, they practice a semi-abstention, and thus earn the semi-indig–
Dation of both sides.
