COEXISTENCE AND IDEOLOGY
2U
power ratio is inexorably modified in favor of the Soviet Union?
The expression "balance of power," traditional in politico–
military
terminology, has been gradually replaced by the "balance
of
terror." This change in vocabulary strikes me as meaningful. Until
recently the balance was calculated on the hypothesis of a possibly
prolonged war: in the event of a trial of strength, what resources
could be mobilized by a given state or coalition against another? This
question has lost its point, since a few H-bombs would be enough to
paralyze a medium-sized country and a few dozen would inflict tens
of millions of casualties on a continental state like Russia or the
U.S. Would total war come to an end in a few hours or a few days,
after an exchange of these monstrous projectiles? Nobody knows. All
we do know is that such a war would be senseless for all concerned
unless it were waged unilaterally.
No political advantage obtained
through victory could possibly match the cost of the war itself, unless
one side had the technological means to protect itself from bombard–
ment. In other words, it would be utter lunacy for a ruler to touch
off a total war at the present time if he were not virtually assured
of destroying the enemy's entire capacity for reprisal at one blow.
Such
is
the definition of the balance of terror. This balance exists as
long as neither side has, or rather can be assured of having, the
power to destroy all means of reprisal from the opposing side.
The balance of terror, thus defined, has not been upset by the
fact that the Soviets have probably taken the lead in the field of
ballistic weapons. It could be decisively upset in one way only: by
a simultaneous superiority in offensive and defensive power.
If
the
Soviet Union possessed an effective defense against ,air attack and
a monopoly of ballistic weapons at the same time, while the United
States were still vulnerable to the latter, then the United States would
be
at the mercy of its rival.
This is not the case at present. Even if Soviet intercontinental
missiles are ready for military use at this very moment-an improb–
able supposition-American air power, thanks to the number and
cmpersion of its bases, is still capable of piercing the enemy's land–
based rocket barrages. At least the percentage of aircraft that could
get
through would be sufficient to inflict enormous devastation. Sup–
posing, on the other hand, that the American air forces could no
bnger get through the rocket barrages and that Soviet intercontinental
