COEXISTENCE AND IDEOLOGY
us
annies did become engaged in a non-vital theater, the opposing gov–
ernments could
reasonably
be expected to attempt to keep such con–
flicts within limits and to avoid using a destructive power out of
all
proportion to their political purposes.
* * *
Since a general settlement is excluded and the preservation of
the balance of terror is probable, what are the chances of partial
agreements in one or another of the regions of the world where the
interests, ambitions and ideals of the two coalitions are in conflict?
Let us briefly examine three of the diplomatic theaters of operations:
Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East.
In Europe the situation has not fundamentally changed since
1945, except for the dissidence of Tito and the spectacular episode
of the Berlin blockade. The countries liberated by the Soviet armies
have been sovietized, the demarcation line drawn during the war by
the diplomats in London has remained the frontier between the two
worlds. The great event which has occurred in the meantime, how–
ever,
will
probably prove in the long run to be of decisive importance,
although it
is
not visible on the map: Soviet Russia has failed in
both phases of her dual undertaking in Eastern Europe. The :subject
peoples have not become resigned to Russification and the youth
have not been converted to Communism. The tide of popular senti–
ment is running in favor of the democratic regimes and against Com–
munism or any other sort of authoritarian regime. (In this respect,
the old world is perhaps an exception, for elsewhere the new situation
would seem rather to resemble that of Europe in the Thirties).
A fair-minded appraisal of George Kennan's views, as set forth
in
his
Reith Lectures,
l
must first of all recall that they are based
on one major premise: if the Europeans were free to determine
their fate they would choose the West, democracy. Even the Com–
munists in Hungary and Poland, who would probably retain collec–
tive ownership of the factories, would attempt to reintroduce free
political institutions. The proposals of the former American ambas–
sador to Moscow are designed to create a diplomatic situation within
which the Europeans would manifest their preference. Such a situa–
tion, says Kennan, could be created by the withdrawal of the Russian
and
American armies.
In the long run it is hard to see how the unity of Europe could
