COEXISTEN C E AND IDEO LOGY
231
iet-dominated countries. The opposition of the first group is based
primarily on their refusal to believe in the reality or possibility of the
hypothesis that Communism could abdicate its
claim
to universality,
in
other words that it could accept the existence of heretical or pagan
states. What is the probability of such a conversion? This
is
.a moot
point. But logically a "Macchiavelian" should agree to peace be–
tween democratic Westerners and Russian Communism if ever and
whenever the latter recognizes the right to exist of a welfare-minded
capitalism, such .as we have in Scandinavia or the United States.
The moralists will object that the West would deny its own
values
if
it ceased to believe in the universal validity of its ideas. We
suggest no such denial. But a free press, political parties, and a parlia–
mentary system cannot be propagated at bayonet point or by means
of intercontinental rockets. In any case, the West cannot bring about
a reform of the Soviet regime, much less a revolution that would
dtstroy it. How can the West most effectively promote the evolution
of
the Soviet regime? The question is open, but it is a political and
not a moral one. Sounding the anti-Communist trumpets will not
bring the walls down. There
is
no particular merit in shouting one's
Utaste for Communism as loudly as possible.
There remains the case of the forcibly sovietized countries of
Eastern Europe, whose plight we cannot recognize as definitive.
Po–
litically, the West rejects the European status quo, so dear to Mr.
Khrushchev's heart. In this sense and on this level, Western diplomacy
is
and must remain on the offensive. But we have neither the means
nor the will to pursue this offensive by force. We know that our ob–
jective can be attained only through negotiation (the withdrawal of
Soviet and American troops) or through a change in the ideas or
in
the methods of the Kremlin.
If
the Communists ceased to believe
ia
the universal dissemination of their doctrine and their institutions,
a relaxation of Russian domination over Eastern Europe would be–
ame less improbable.
There
is
no reason to believe, at this writing, that Soviet strategy
IllS
changed or that Mr. Khrushchev has abandoned the dogmas of
• Leninist-Stalinist credo-to the effect that capitalism
is
bad and
will
die, and that Soviet Communism
is
good and will triumph. Can
, credo be equated with the formula: Mr. Khrushchev (or the
'et
Union)
is
seeking world domination? The situation is not as
