The Politics of Violence in Kenya,
By Susanne D. Mueller
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Abstract. This paper argues that Kenya was precariously perched and poised to implode before the 2007 presidential election because of three underlying precipitating factors: a gradual frittering away of the states monopoly of legitimate force and a consequent generalized level of violence not always within its control; deliberately weak institutions, mostly overridden by a highly personalized and centralized presidency, that could and did not exercise the autonomy or checks and balances normally associated with democracies; and political parties that were not programmatic, were driven by ethnic clientism, and had a winner-take-all view of political power and its associated economic byproducts. These factors put Kenya on a dangerous precipice notwithstanding the many impressive changes experienced under its new government. The argument presented here is that the 2007 election, which was too close to call beforehand and contested afterwards, was the spark that ignited them. Hence, Kenya’s descent into a spiral of killing and destruction along ethnic lines and the consequent fracturing of the fragile idea of nation was not altogether surprising.