CLAUDE ESTIER
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agrees with Mr. Reagan , and that we don't take his plans and
pronouncements as seriously as you do. A lot of it is rhetoric. But
there are other, more crucial exports.... For example, you sell
arms to other countries, and it's a little difficult to understand
why a Socialist country would do so. But let' s go on to another
subject. What do you think would become of your relations with
the Soviet Union if in fact there were a conflict between America
and the Soviet Union . Would France be neutral?
Estier:
No, we don't think that France can be a country like Sweden
or Switzerland-that is , a country that takes refuge behind a
facade of neutrality, which allows it to avoid all confrontations.
We know very well that if there were a major conflict, particularly
one in Europe, France would be in the middle of it. Therefore, we
must help avoid such a showdown. But this does not depend on
France. The problem, today, is in the danger of the build-up of
nuclear weapons by the two superpowers-the Americans and the
Soviets-and by the accumulation of missiles able to destroy the
planet ten times, twenty times, fifty times. This constitutes a peril
for peace, for the survival of humanity. We are in favor of
anything leading to negotiations by the two superpowers; and we
are in favor of disarmament-a utopia that has been talked about
from the beginning. But in order to achieve any reduction of
weapons, there must be a balance of power.
If
one of the two
superpowers has an advantage over the other, it will not engage in
serious disarmament negotiations.
Kurzweil:
Perhaps. But America had such an advantage and did not
start a war-possibly because as a democratic country it could not
do so. Now Russia is in that position . America no longer seems to
have the advantage .
Estier:
We think, in Europe, that the Soviet Union has more and
better missiles. And it is for this reason that France, though
outside NATO, has given its support to the deployment of new
deterrent missiles, which may allow the balance to be restored.
This is not to increase the arsenal but simply to help bring about
true negotiations that may end up with something. We believe,
moreover, that the shifts in the Soviet Union resulting from
Brezhnev's death-not that the Soviet regime is going to
change-could be the occasion for new initiatives. And we think
that-how shall I put it?-we must strengthen the will of the West
to restore the military balance . This could also lead the new
