MORDECHAI GAZIT
365
tabled . Trygue Lie, the U. N . Secreta ry-Genera l a t the time,
se riously considered res igning as a result. In his memo irs , Lie notes
tha t the American turna bout on pa rtition has neve r been expla ined ,
and he wonders whether the United Sta tes had bee n surpri sed by
stronge r Arab oppos ition a nd less British coopera ti on tha n expected .
He adds tha t the United Sta tes might have feared tha t support for
pa rtiti on would ha ve had adve rse effec ts upon the oil concession held
by Ame rican interes ts in Arab territory.
From the Israe li sta ndpoint , even the mos t cha rita ble expla na–
tion for Truma n's poli cy - tha t when he took the trusteeship dec ision
he acted in wha t he conceived to be the bes t interes ts of Israel- is
hardl y sati sfac tory.
If
the performa nce of the Israelis on the
battlefi eld , mad e poss ible by the purchase of a rms in Czechoslovakia
a nd not in the United Sta tes, had bee n a ny less brillia nt , the Spec ial
Sess ion of the U .N . would probably have seriously considered the
Truma n admini tra ti on's proposal. In hi s a utobiogra phy Abba Eban
tells us how Truma n , "hav ing Dr. Weizma nn on hi s conscie nce,"
conveyed through dev ious cha nnel s a message to the Israelis.
"If
the
General Assembl y sess ion could be surmounted without reversing
pa rtItIOn , a nd if a J ewi sh sta te was decla red on its own
res ponsibility , the pres ident would recogni ze it immedi a tel y." Eba n
refl ec ts: "H ere was a Pres ide nt of the United States willing to
recogni ze a J ewi sh tate if it was es ta blished in defi a nce of the
trusteeship proposal tha t hi s own Sta te Depa rtment was seeking to
press on the U . N ." Appa rently it did not occur to Truman on thi s
occas ion tha t the buck stopped on hi s desk.
Even Truma n' de fac to recogniti on of the sta te of Israel
immedi a tely a ft er the procl ama ti on of its independence on M ay 14,
1948, has to be see n in its proper per pective. U.S . Sec re ta ry of Sta te
George C. M a rsha ll had wa rned Moshe Sh a rett seve ra l d ays be fo re
the eve nt to con sider whether to decla re Israel's independe nce a t a ll.
His words were ringing in Sha rett's ears:
"If
you ma ke tha t dec ision ,
you will be alone .
If
you succeed , I will wish you we ll. But I warn
you not to accept milita ry advice too eas il y." In the li ght of sub–
sequent events, these were somber words tha t had a demoralizing
effec t where encouragement was so rely needed.
Enough has been writte n in memoirs a nd confirmed by offi cial
docume nts fo r u s to wonder whe ther Truma n was a convinced pro–
ponent of recogniti on . T he impress ion one gathers is tha t he took hi s
dec ision somewha t less tha n wholeheartedl y.
Al so, a t tha t time Israel was trongly supported by the Sov iet
Uni on . The USSR had a nnounced tha t it would gra nt Israel a full
de jure, a nd not , as Truma n had done, a mere de fac to recognition ,
