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provide a ma tch for the Arab a rmies. On the contrary, U .S . pre–
dictions for Israel's cha nces of surviva l we re gloomy.
The arms emba rgo, perce ived in Israel as an a ba ndonment by
its greatest fri end , had a forma tive effec t on Israeli thinkin g tha t is
probably more enduring than the effects of la ter U .S . policies
conce rning Israel.
M any years la ter , in the earl y seventies, when American
pos itions towa rd Israel had cha nged considerably, J oseph Al sop ,
exaspera ted with Israel i suspicions, traumas, a nd lack of fa ith in the
United Sta tes, accused Prime Ministe r Golda M eir of hav ing a
"M assada complex." H ad he attacked merely her preoccupat ion with
Israel's security problems, Mrs. M eir mi ght have objec ted less . But
the talk about a "complex," as if Israel had imagined such great
difficulties as its solitude in 1948, caused Mrs . M eir to reac t
impa tientl y. T he mos t importa n t lessons tha t Israel had lea rned
were neve r to take securi ty ri sks, neve r to trust interna ti onal
guarantees, and to evalu a te without illu sion the intentions of even
fri ends and a llies. T he events whi ch had resulted in Israel's dilemma
all belonged to the recen t pas t and should have been , Mrs. M eir felt ,
common knowledge.
De Gaull e's volte-face in 1967, coming just a few years a fter he
had toas ted France's friendship and a lliance with Israel, is a good
example of why Israel looks criticall y at friends a nd allies. Israe l had
bee n completely convinced that Fra nce would be a rock of firmness
and dependability for years a nd year to come. But because of
Fra nce's fi ckleness, mos t Israel is beli eve that wha t happened in Pa ris
could happen a nywhere, eve n in Was hington . M a ny Israe lis feel
tha t the American record conce rning Israel , though one of the mos t
impressive in the annals of fri endship between na tions, is neve r–
theless imperfec t.
Pres ident Truma n's 1948 a rms emba rgo was onl y one a nti–
Israeli dec ision made by this "sta unch" fri end of the new sta te. A day
a fte r he had reluctantl y rece ived Dr. C ha im Weizmann , pres ident of
the World Zioni st Organi zati on , the U. S delegati on to the United
Nat ions not onl y proposed a tempora ry suspension of the pa rtiti on
plan , tha t is, the idea of a J ew ish state, but a lso took the ini tia ti ve in
propos ing a Spec ia l Sess ion of the U. N. General Assembl y, to meet
in April 1948,
to
consider a U .N . tru steeship for Pa les tine. Even if
Truma n was taken by surpri se by the timing of tha t a nnouncement ,
whi ch came onl y a day a fter he had reassured Dr. Weizmann about
American intentions, he himsel f had authori zed the tru steeship
proposal. He had made no mention to Dr. Weizmann th a t such an
ini tia ti ve was being prepared , a nd he did no t call it off a fte r it was
