60
NORMAN PODHORETZ
a dim memory, intoned mechanically, drained of
all
vitality, nothing
in them left to inspire thought or passion, hatred or love. Or even,
irony of ironies, political action.
To me, the most hopeful development in years is the recent
reappearance of a body of utopian social criticism based on a very
clear vision of what a decent life on this planet might look like, and
full of concrete ideas which, if they have little chance of being put
into immediate effect, at least serve to refresh and nourish our fading
sense of what the liberal-radical tradition has always stood for and
how far short we still are of achieving it. The priests are forever
distorting the prophets- sometimes by a successful pretense of being
prophets themselves. And the only remedy is for the prophets to
say them nay and remind them of what the Lord really demands
of man.
6. It seems fairly well established that Khrushchev's objective is
to spread Communism by any means he can find short of nuclear
war. His foreign policy aims, in other words, differ from Stalin's
only in the tactics he is using to achieve them. The objectives of
the West, however, have changed. I don't think anyone in the West
seriously entertains the hope of roll-back or liberation any longer;
at most there is the dim and distant hope of forcing Khrushchev
to renounce his imperialist aims or buying enough time through
deterrence for changes to take place in the Communist world. In the
shorter run, the West is committed to stopping the advance of Com–
munism by any means short of nuclear war where it is possible to do
so, and by nuclear war in certain areas (Berlin and Formosa). This,
of course, puts the West continually on the defensive while Khrush–
chev is at liberty to probe, push, and swing at
his
own initiative.
Since Khrushchev appears to be convinced that he can achieve his
objectives without a nuclear war, I doubt that we need to worry
about the Russians deliberately provoking us into one; the real danger
is that they will provoke us into one without meaning to--that, in
other words, they will impose one frustration too many on a sorely
tried adversary. Therefore, if Khrushchev really wants to avoid a
nuclear war, he would be wise to limit his own objectives and settle
for what he has always claimed he wanted-namely recognition of
the status quo, disarmament, and "peaceful" competition. The ques–
tion is, if Khrushchev were willing to negotiate such a settlement
