THE COLD WAR AND THE WEST
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how much resistance would be offered by the population, and finally,
how long might it take for the Russians and/or Chinese to become
"Americanized?" I know that this sounds unserious, but if we are
being asked to make our choices on the basis of unflinching "realism"
and rationality, I don't see why the alternative of surrender (which
I do
not
favor ) should not be made as "thinkable" .as the possibility
of nuclear war has been made in the last year or two.
DAVID RIESMAN
1.
In many ways the very preoccupation in our country
with "winning" or "losing" the cold war with the Soviet Union is
a distraction from the deeper problems of an unevenly affluent
society.
Writing these comments in Japan, I am reminded of the enor–
mous impact of Western values as well as Western techniques even
in
countries and among social strata that are often considered (and
sometimes profess to be) "anti-American:" in most of the less
developed countries of the world, including the Soviet Union, our
vices as well as our accomplishments (including among the latter
our effort to provide relatively open encouragement to talent through
a widespread system of public education) are imitated
in
spite of
periodic nativist resistance.
If
we do not in a game of mutual terror
destroy ourselves in nuclear war, or bury ourselves underground
literally and culturally in the frustrations that the cold war intensi–
fies, we can permit ourselves to realize the extent to which the West
is very much a going concern. And yet, especially in the United
States, we are persuaded by illusions of omnipotence, by demagogic
pressures on our leadership, and by belligerent mass media, that we
have suffered one defeat after another (Cuba, Laos, South Vietnam
-you name the next one) and that we must stop this process of
apparent attrition by "standing firm" in the revolutionary world.
The cold war has strengthened and made visible some endemic
shortcomings in our society. We have not been simply a "peace
