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with differing beliefs may seem odiously tyrannical. Moreover (though
Jouvenel does not see this point) the element of subjectivity is en–
demic to his conception of liberty, relating liberty (as it does) to the
changing moral conscience, whereas it is inherent in the liberal concep–
tion only (as we have seen) when this conception is interpreted in a
particular way. Nor does our author ever trouble to raise the question
whether the note of subjectivity in a conception of liberty is or is not
a defect.
If
he had done so, he might have realized that there is all
the difference between a view that makes liberty subjective in the sense
that our judgments whether X is free depend for their truth in part
on X's sentiments and opinions, and a view that would make liberty
subjective in the sense that our judgments whether X is free depend
for their truth in part on our moral beliefs. The former is surely true,
the second false. Jouvenel rejects the first in favor of the second.
In the last chapter of his book, Jouvenel turns his attention to the
principle of toleration or liberty of opinion, which is, he says, more than
democracy "the basic principle of the political institutions of the West."
All of us or nearly all of us embrace this principle. But why? What is
its authorization? To find an answer to this question according to
Jouvenel is an urgent task, because to do so is "to arrive at certain fun–
damental axioms of our political reasoning which it is important to
bring to the light of day." His own answer is that the authorization or
foundation of toleration is a belief in "natural light" or "Postulate of
Convergence," i.e., the postulate that men's opinions "gravitate naturally
towards truth and justice." This postulate in turn is connected with the
belief that human mind or nature participates in the Divine essence.
"When that is no more believed, the whole edifice [i.e. of liberal de–
mocracy] collapses."
This answer is a familiar one by now, but since it is received very
favorably in certain quarters, it may be worth while considering it even
in the rather elusive form given
to
it by our author. In the first place,
much of it hinges on an ambiguity in the notion of authorization or
foundation. For to say that a postulate A is the foundation of a prin–
ciple P might be to say that from A, P follows, so that if A is true then
P also is true; alternatively it might be to say that from P, A follows,
so that
if
P is true then A also is true. Now it should be obvious that
if A is a foundation of P in the first sense, A can be false and P true.
However
if
A is the foundation of P in the second sense,
if
A is false
P is false. Jouvenel appears to ignore this. For he argues directly from
the fact that the Postulate of Convergence is a foundation for toleration
to the conclusion that toleration cannot be believed in by those who
reject the postulate. The error is, alas, not uncommon today.
