BOO KS
625
the distinctive feature of the open society
is
that in it different members
pursue different ends.
At this point it might be thought that in his flight Jouvenel
has
wheeled full circle and that he is after all prepared to accept the
view that the social good is a construct out of personal goods. To which
all that can be said is that he isn't. Exactly why Jouvcnel rejects ,the
central doctrine of classical liberaliim is unclear, for his argumentation
on this score is compressed to the point of unintelligibility. What is sig–
nificant though-and here he is typical of contemporary anti-liberal
thinking-is that having rejected a "reductionist" account of the com–
mon good, he does not then go on to embrace a rigorous theory like
that of Natural Law, but on the contrary strikes out against any fixed
abstract conception of justice. Indeed he even produces what he calls
a proof that there cannot
be
a just social order. (The word "proof'
here is a misnomer, for in fact the argument consists of various inde–
pendent propositions.)
Justice according to Jouvenel is a matter of distribution. We dis–
tribute commodities justly or we distribute them unjustly. In order to
effect a distribution we must first arrange the potential recipients in
a serial order and we then distribute to each according to his position
in the series. The distribution is just if the serial order
in
accordance
with which we distribute is the relevant one; if it is not the relevant
one, the distribution is unjust. So (to quote Jouvenel's own example)
suppose I establish a fund to enable young people to visit the picture
galleries of Italy.
If
I then lay it down that this prize money is to be
distributed amongst applicants according to the blondness of their hair,
I shall be said to have acted unjustly- for in such matters the color
of hair is surely irrelevant.
If
however the money is to be distributed
according to the artistic ability of the candidates or according to the
likelihood of their benefiting from the journey, the distribution will be
called fair-for the distribution will then be made in accordance with
a relevant serial order. So the "notion of relevance is fundamental to
all problems of justice."
Against this background of justice as the correct rule of distribution,
Jouvenel's three propositions can now be stated. First, there can nearly
always
be
some reasonable doubt whether any occasion is a correct occa–
sion for any sort of distribution. For most commodities can be seen
under two aspects: on the one hand, as
fruits,
as results of the produc–
tive process, and therefore ripe for distribution, on the other hand as
assets,
as agents in the productive process, and therefore requiring con–
&erVation. In deciding whether to distribute or not, we have to decide
