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PARTISAN REVIEW
course they are directly addressed to the people themselves. Jou–
vene! declares himself aware of this objection and answers it (I
think) by saying that this is precisely what he is doing. He is the modern
Machiavelli whispering practical wisdom into the ear of his Prince,
only his Prince happens to be the people.
If
this is how he really sees
himself, this gives a fair idea of his sense of political reality.
Having to his satisfaction established the legitimacy of his inquiry
(Introduction), the author goes on (Part II) to counter certain doc–
trines which would limit its scope or interest. In the first place, it is not
true that the common good is self-evident-a view associated by the
author exclusively with Jacobinism. On the contrary, perfectly honorable
and patriotic men can disagree about it in good faith, so there is room
here for serious discussion and
the
intervention of "the philosopher."
Secondly, it is not true that the common good is subjective--a view
associated by the author exclusively with Nominalism. For it is surely
undeniable that when two people discuss, say, the welfare of France
and disagree, they are in one clear sense discussing and disagreeing
about the same thing. Thirdly, it is not true that the common good
consists in the sum of particular goods. For particular goods conflict
and it cannot be the role of public authority to settle these disputes
by reference either to the individual's conception of his particular good
(for this would lead to anarchy) or by reference to the authority's own
conception of it (for this would lead to tyranny).
At this stage, Jouvenel's own argument takes wing.
If
the common
good is not a function of private goods, then it must be connected with
the community itself and its properties, more specifically with its co–
hesiveness and its ability to survive. As "a working hypothesis," he adopts
the idea that the common good consists in "the social state itself and
its successive advances"; and this he goes on in a later chapter to ex–
pand by reference to "social friendship" and "mutual trustfulness." To
many this will seem familiar argument, leading on naturally to a defense
of the integrated society and its waITIl tight-knit sense of community.
But such is not Jouvenel's way. At the last moment he pulls back. He
resists the blandishments of the tribal society; he rejects the "corollaries"
(as he calls them) of his view of the common good, i.e., that society
should be small, that it should be homogeneous in population and cul–
ture, and that it should be immutable; and he declares that his only
aim is to urge upon "the open society" of modem life methods for
obtaining trust and friendship which are parallel to, though different
from, those appropriate to "the closed society" of prehistory and an–
tiquity. Different they must be, for whereas a closed society has an end,
