On The Disclosure of Moral Values In The Arts: A Value-Realist Account

Influenced by Max Scheler, Nicolai Hartmann’s Ethics theorizes an “axiological” dimension of Being populated by ideal objects he calls “values.” Like mathematical objects, they are essentially atemporal and immaterial, but can be “actualized” in the spatio-temporal world. However, we perceive values through a unique faculty of “value-feeling.” Within this framework, I offer an account of why and how art is uniquely equipped to disclose moral values. I contend that while moral values inhere only in persons and their acts, artifacts can disclose moral values whether or not they actualize them. They do so by facilitating acts of imagination whose objects instantiate moral values. Moreover, drawing on Dietrich von Hildebrand’s and Edith Stein’s theories of affectivity, I argue that even non-representational artworks can disclose moral values by simulating the affective states appropriate to their perception.