U.S. Pullout of Afghanistan: What If?

After the first Wikileaks dump this past summer, in which the Australia-based whistle-blower site publicized more than 75,000 classified military documents pertaining to the war in Afghanistan, the New York Times devoted an entire editorial page to President Barack Obama’s handling of the nine-year conflict. Among the concerns: the withdrawal deadline, which Obama set for summer 2011, but not before a troop buildup.

The editorial noted that “President Obama was intentionally vague last December when he said that American troops would begin to transfer out of Afghanistan by July 2011. At the time, we agreed that a deadline, so long as it was not set in stone, made sense. Americans need to know this war will not go on forever. [Afghanistan President Hamid] Karzai needs to know that American protection is not open-ended. American generals and diplomats need to know that their work is being closely reviewed.

"Since then, the administration has sent a host—a cacophony—of conflicting signals about the deadline, the strategy, and its commitment to the war.

"Americans need regular, straight talk from President Obama about what is happening in Afghanistan, for good and ill, and the plan going forward. More ambiguity will only add to the anxiety and confusion.”

With the national midterm elections less than a week away, Americans remain focused on jobs and the economy. But the conflict in corruption-riddled Afghanistan, which is costing billions of dollars that might otherwise be injected into the arm of the ailing U.S. economy, still looms large. To date, some $300 billion has been allocated to the war, and more than 1,000 U.S. soldiers have died there since October 2001. So, what if the administration announced tomorrow the immediate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Afghanistan? Easier said than done, no doubt. But to help explore that question, BU Today consulted experts on campus to find out their views on what a sudden (relatively speaking) post–United States Afghanistan might look like. Below are some of their thoughts.

Nick Mills (left), College of Communication associate professor of journalism, author of Karzai: The Failing American Intervention and the Struggle for Afghanistan (Wiley, 2007).
Even if the United States announced a total withdrawal tomorrow, it would take months for the pullout to be completed. But let’s say that’s the scenario—the United States announces tomorrow that it is beginning a complete withdrawal, to take place as quickly as possible, and the last U.S. forces will leave Afghanistan on, say, March 31. During that period, the Afghan government would either have to ramp up the training and equipping of its own security forces to the point where self-defense would be possible, or accept the inevitability of a Taliban takeover and let it happen sooner rather than later. I expect in either event the Taliban would win. The result would no doubt be bloody, as it was when the Taliban first came to power. Many Afghans would again flee the country, as they did after the Soviet invasion.



But Afghanistan today is a different place than the country the Taliban captured in 1996, and even then they didn’t capture the north. The Afghan population is young and fairly progressive, at least in the cities. They are plugged into the world in ways that they were not in the 1990s—young Afghans surf the Web, talk on cell phones, use email, watch TV, listen to radio. I think the Taliban would face considerable pushback this time around. And over time I think the Taliban movement would die, crushed by the burdens of its own irrationality and senseless cruelty. The Afghan people hated the Taliban when they were in power and would hate them again, almost universally, and that hatred would eventually translate into change.



As long the U.S. and NATO militaries remain in Afghanistan, there is no hope for an end to the insurgency and there is no chance for organic, indigenous change to come to Afghanistan. We could keep on killing insurgents, but others would take their place. We could keep on letting our soldiers be killed and maimed providing protection for an amazingly corrupt government. Or we could step aside and let the Afghans work things out over time. There is no pretty answer, no graceful or peaceful resolution.

Douglas Kriner (left), College of Arts & Sciences assistant professor of political science, author of The Casualty Gap: The Causes and Consequences of American Wartime Inequalities (Oxford University Press, 2010), with Francis Shen; and After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War (University of Chicago Press, 2010).
I think the answer to the question depends on the precise nature of the withdrawal announcement and the timetable that it would establish. However, on the whole, politically I think such a move would be somewhat advantageous for the Obama administration. Throughout much of the 2008 campaign, Obama consciously tried to contrast the “good war” in Afghanistan with the “bad war” in Iraq. When he made these arguments, a clear majority of Americans continued to support the war in Afghanistan, even as the public expressed a strong preference for a drawdown in Iraq. Since 2008, a significant reversal has taken place. Leading congressional Democrats rebelled against Obama’s two troop surges there in 2009. Democratic leaders largely succeeded in blunting the most severe challenges to the administration’s policies, but this revolt helped erode even further support for the war on the left. Today, a clear majority of Americans oppose the war and believe that success there, however it is defined, is unlikely.



An accelerated withdrawal would likely begin to bridge the rift within the Democratic Party, and it would follow the majority sentiment that this is a war whose prospects for success are fading and whose costs are spiraling out of control at a time when calls for fiscal conservatism dominate the political scene.



However, I believe that any political benefits the administration would stand to gain will be tempered by two forces. First, Republicans undoubtedly would criticize the administration sharply, as they did the initial announcement of a summer 2011 timeline for beginning a phased withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan. Such attacks on the administration being soft on national security and terrorism might move public opinion somewhat from what currently appears to be very strong support for an even earlier withdrawal. The other force that might limit any political gains to an earlier Afghan exit is that, right now at least, Afghanistan has such a low salience among the general public. If the administration were able to frame the decision partially as focusing resources on domestic problems in a time of economic crisis, that might bring some advantages, but it is unclear to what extent this would happen.

Thomas Barfield (above), CAS professor of anthropology, president of the American Institute for Afghanistan Studies, and author of Afghanistan: a Cultural and Political History (Princeton University Press, 2010).
Afghanistan would fall into civil war like the 1990s. Al-Qaeda would return in the wake of the Taliban. The Democrats would be blamed for any terrorist attack on the United States thereafter. There will be no development if international forces withdraw, because a civil war in the aftermath of that will make such development difficult or impossible. Opium production would surge and expand to other provinces.

The development of Afghanistan minerals, however, could change the political dynamic there by providing the country with a large new income stream, but also because it would give its neighbors, particularly China, a stronger incentive to seek stability there.


Abdul Rauf Karimi (LAW’11) (above), Afghan trial court judge, based in Kabul.
The decision of President Obama’s administration to start withdrawing U.S. forces from Afghanistan by mid 2011 has greatly hampered progress there. It has boosted the morale of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremists. It has also demoralized Afghanistan’s governmental institutions. Afghans working in the government, uncertain of their future, do not want to risk their lives for a government that will collapse within a week after the United States and NATO suspend operations in Afghanistan.

Our police are not capable of enforcing the rule of law and maintaining order. Our national army still requires support and training to defend against the Taliban and other extremists. President Karzai and his counterparts are certain that they will not be able to rule Afghanistan without the presence of coalition forces in Afghanistan. The United States and NATO member countries are also very much certain about this fact.

Despite the fact that all the stakeholders understand that a country like Afghanistan, destroyed by three decades of war, cannot be rebuilt overnight, they still have not developed a long-term comprehensive strategy for development. All NATO member countries have different policies and strategies for rebuilding Afghanistan. Most are short-term-oriented and based on quick impact approaches.

While everyone believes that the United States will not withdraw its military forces from Afghanistan by mid 2011 and that it is just more political propaganda, I think it’s imperative that the United States and its allies start to develop a more effective, collective, and long-term strategy for sustainable development. Without a solid Afghan security sector, police, army, and the judicial sector, and effective civil institutions, it is impossible for the government to deliver services to the local population. And if the rule of law is not enforced and essential public goods are not provided to Afghan citizens, it will not be possible to win their hearts and minds. Their positive mentality toward the government is indeed the most important weapon to defeat the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other extremists, and also the most critical instrument for developing a prosperous Afghanistan.

Lt. Taylor Downs (CAS’08) (above), 3rd platoon, 74th EOD, stationed in eastern Afghanistan.
Personally, I think immediate withdrawal would be a negative. I don’t think that Afghanistan is politically and economically strong enough to turn itself into a stable country. I don’t think this country has ever been stable politically or socially. But that’s kind of indicative of the nature of the population. It’s not like the United States, where you have people from everywhere who have very short histories in certain areas. Everyone and their families have been here for hundreds and hundreds of years, so they have very deep roots, and because of that they’re very much less globalized. It’s almost difficult for them to see the bigger picture. I don’t think that they would be able to sufficiently defend themselves from those who are striving to assert their influence over the population and enforce their way of life on the people.

Shahla Haeri (left), CAS associate professor of cultural anthropology and former director of BU’s Women’s Studies Program.
First, the American government should not pull out without considering all aspects of what this action will mean. Second, we cannot just worry what will happen to women. The entire society is involved. We can’t just say, if the Americans leave tomorrow, then all women are going to have their noses cut off. It won’t happen—not to all women! If we assume that the tension and conflict between women and men is manifested only in that horrible example, we’re not going to get anywhere. Not every single father, brother, husband, uncle, and son has a negative or hostile view of their womenfolk. There are many men who care for their women. We should place our stress on the “ethics of care,” and not on setting one against the other, not pose men and women as adversaries, but rather as people who care for each other and who want to have a better society for themselves and their families.



One way or another, the United States has to leave Afghanistan. We have to accept responsibility for what we are leaving behind. The idea is to be agents of constructive change between women and men. We can point to girls’ education and say, “Look what happens when your daughters go to school, look how much happier they are, how much better it is for the entire family, not just for women.” Women don’t live in isolation. They live in the community and with men. They take care of their sons, who may grow up to become leaders.

We need to start a process of reconciliation between the Taliban, Karzai, women, NGOs, and others involved in building the civil society. Because this is a very divided society, unless we aim for a national reconciliation and encourage negotiations between different factions, we will leave a bitter legacy behind.

Lt. Col. Scott Williams (left), professor and chairman of BU’s Military Science Division, Iraq war veteran, and head of ROTC.
From a military perspective, it’s obvious that all military families would probably breathe a sigh of relief, but I also know they want the job to be done. They don’t want the withdrawal to be simply political, because if it is, the conflict may come up again, and we start over. From a soldier and military perspective, we simply want the mission to be met, as defined by the president in this case. There has been a lot of sacrifice, and when you commit that kind of time and sacrifice, you want it to be worth something, so that when you walk away, you can literally say, “Job well done,” and it’s over. The tough thing is, what are the objectives, which I think has been a difficult thing to define over the years, and how do we meet them? Success can’t be clear if you don’t know what you’re working for.

Caleb Daniloff can be reached at cdanilof@bu.edu.