An Economic Response to Unsolicited (spam) Communication

Marshall Van Alstyne, Informations Systems Dept., SMG, Boston University
Wednesday, February 15, 11:00 AM, MCS 135

This talk will investigate ways to improve total communications value in the context of spam. We analyze best-in-class solutions from law, technology, and economics. Comparison leads to several useful conclusions. First, economic mechanisms designed to promote valuable communication can outperform those designed to block wasteful communication. The best mechanism can, on occasion, outperform even a “perfect filter.” Second, it is advantageous to shift focus from message content to senders’ private knowledge. Information revelation mechanisms can then force people who knowingly misuse communication to drop out or incur higher costs. Third, giving recipients rights in their own attention can improve willingness to signal their preferences, which facilitates efficient sender targeting.

Biography:

Professor Van Alstyne received a BA from Yale, and MS and PhD degrees from MIT. He is interested in the economics of information, its value, production, property rights, and effects on firms and social systems. In designing information goods, his research concerns how firms use information and network effects to compete. In control over information, it concerns who has access to what information, when, and at what price. In measuring output, one long term empirical study is investigating how information and technology make white-collar professionals more productive. In software property rights, this balances open source licensing against those that make profits and stimulate innovation. His research has received an NSF Career Award, 2 best paper awards, and has appeared in Science, Management Science, Harvard Business Review, and the popular press. It is also taught in several major US business schools. Host: Steve Homer

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