Rational Secure Computation and Ideal Mechanism Design
Speaker: Silvio Micali, MIT
Wednesday, November 9, 3:10 PM, Room CAS 313, 685 Commonwealth Ave.
We put forward and implement Rational Secure Computation, a stronger notion of secure computation that does not depend on players’ honesty, but solely on their rationality.
The key to our result is showing that the ballot box—the venerable device used throughout the world to privately and correctly compute the tally of secret votes—can actually be used to securely compute ANY function of secret inputs.
Our work bridges the fields of Game Theory and Cryptography, and has broad implications for Mechanism Design. In particular, we show how to construct mechanisms that guarantee the maximum privacy about the players’ types (while leaving all incentives intact), and how to achieve Modular Mechanism Design.
Joint work with Sergei Izmalkov and Matt Lepinski
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Host: Leo Reyzin