160
PARTISAN IUVIEW
American position was the key precondition that made possible the peace–
ful unification of Germany. Throughout the Cold War in Europe, lIlost
recently in the disputes over the euroillissiles of the 1980s, Moscow sought
to reduce or eliminate American power in Europe. During the postwar era
Soviet leaders viewed the AlIlerican presence in Europe as a serious mili–
tary and political threat. Some of the most rel1larkable passages in the
authors' account recall the change in this basic view and the ability of
Bush, 13aker and their aides to quickly and intelligently grasp the signifi–
cance of the change. If Gerl1lan unification was going to take place-and
it seellls that it cou ld only be stopped by a use of force which Gorbachev
rejected-then fi-om Gorbachev's perspective a unified Gerl1lany within
NATO was less of a nightmare than a unified Germany outside NATO.
130th 13ush and 13aker in meetings with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze
argued that a unified Gerl1lany wIthin NATO was preferable to a unified
Germany tempted to develop
ItS
own nuclear weapons. Instead of being a
source of alarm and mistrust for the Soviets, Kohl's Atlanticism and
Europeanism, his insistence that a unified Gerl1lany be a lIlember of
NATO, served to reassure them that if they could not prevent German uni–
fication, then a unified Gerl1lany within NATO was in the national interest
of the Soviet Union .
In one of his l1leetings with Shevardnadze, 13aker acknowledged that
the idea that a unified Germany was preferable to a neutral Germany,
which the Soviets were initially advocating, "l1light be hard for you
to
believe. In effect it suggests that the risk COl1les not frol1l the United States,
which for a long tillle you've seen as your enemy, but instead it suggests
that greater risk could COl1le fi-om a Ileutral Germany that becomes mili–
taristic." In February
19YO,
when 13aker ll1ade this sal1le argull1ent in the
Kremlin Gorbachev said "basically, I share the course of your thinking...
there is nothing terrifying in the prospect of a unified Gerll1any. The best
way to constrain that process is to ensure that Gerll1any is contained with–
in European structures." Gorbachev assull1ed that there would be no
eastward extension of NATO and now regarded the presence of the
United States in Europe as a stabilizing rather than threatening fact.
After reassurances frolll the American administration Gorbachev, in
his meeting with Kohl in Febru;lry 1
<)<)(),
told the West Gerll1an chancel–
lor that he was willing to accept Gt'rlll,m unifiCltion and that it was up to
the GerIllanS to dccide if ,md when they w;lI1ted to unify. With a Soviet
governl1lent committed to dOl1lestic reforl1l ,md the peaceful devolution of
its el1lpire in Eastern Europe, otlicials in the United States and in the
Feder,11 Republic "were exccl'dingly careful to conduct the unification
process in a way th,lt would not ll1ake the Soviet Union look like the great
loser" and give support to the coalition of ullrcforl1led COll1ll1unists and
