158
I'AlnlSAN I1..EVIEW
remarkable aspect of their story- told at times with a level of detail Elr
beyond what is necessary for their purposes- is that these outcomes came
about with the agreement of Mikhail Corbachev and his Foreign Minister,
Eduard Shevardnadze. This book examines how President George Bush
and Secretary of State James Baker, along with West Cerman Chancellor
Helmut Kohl and their respective aides, sought to attain their maximum
goals while reassuring Soviet as well ;lS other European kaders, that what
was best for the United States and Germany was ;lIso best f()r the Soviet
Union, and the European powers.
As part of the White House forcign policy team, the authors were able
to gain "unlimited access
to
all rckvant documents." Customarily, classi–
fied government documents remain inaccessible
to
scholars ft)]" thirty years.
The authors admit that other schobrs "nlllst, for a time, t;lke on
f~lith
that
we have used our evidence properly." Evcn though histori;lns must object
that they will not be able to check many of the references for some time
to come, the publication of this work as an insider's rcport is nevcrtheless
welcome for it enhances our understanding of very significant events .
One of the main threads of the authors' account concerns the com–
monality of view between Anlt'riCln and West German leaders about
German unification. R.epeatedly, Bush and BakLT sought to assuage not
only Soviet concerns but the muted worril's of Fran(;ois Mittcrand and the
sharp reservations of Margaret Thatcher. In vil'W of the centrality of
American support fi.lr German uniflCltion, the authors nlight have cxam–
ined in more depth why the Americans werl' so Illuch morl' supportive of
unification and Germany's European neighbors. The absellce of a direct
German attack on the Unitl'd
Statl'~
in World War ll,gcogr'lphical distance
fi-om a unifIed Germany, or morc likl'ly, the trust devl'loped bctween thl'
American forcign policy esrablislllllL'nt and the Wl'st GCrllJailS during forty
ye;lrs of Cold War ;lrc left unexplored.
The authors' central argument is not widely l'nough understood out–
side of foreign policy circles. That thc Bush administratioll pursued a
policy aimed at winning the Cold W;lr and ,ltuining the nl,lXinlUnl goals
of the Westerll allIance without hUlllili;ltillg the IcJdcrship of the Soviet
Union or bringing about
J
Sulinist backlash \\,;lS
,I
Ill;ljor ,lccomplishmellt.
When West German politicians, led by Kohl but also by Willy Brandt,
rejoiced in the opening of the W;lIl, Ceorge Bush l'xpressed his pleasure
in a muted and understated mJnner. His reticl'nce, which left the
American public without a clear, dramatic presidclltial statement, had a
purpose. Zelikow and Iz.ice stress th ;lt Bush was concL'rned that American
gloating or triumphalism would underminc Soviet, and, early on, East
German support ftlr reform. How to win the Cold W;lr wi thout humili;1t–
ing Corb;lchev was a major preoccupation ft)]- Bush aml L3,lker.
