1300KS
159
Second, All1erican support f()r GerInan unification cOll1bined with an
American cOll1ll1itIncllt to ITnlain a ll1ilitary power in Europe and
to
locate a unified Cerll1any within NATO was necessary in order to con–
vince the European coulltries adjacellt to the Soviet Union and Germany
to accept this outcoll1e. Zelikow and R.ice recoullt how, in the midst of the
summer crisis of
I<)H<:)
caused by the stream of East German refugees
departing for Austria and West Germany via Hungary. West German
Chancellor Heltnut Kohl t()LlIld strong support fi'onl President l3ush for
the view that a unified Germany would not be a threat
to
Europe. Despite
reservations, l3ush "settled the issue once and for all" within the American
government and supported Kohl's gestures pointing to unification as a
desired outcome-at a time when the l3ritish and French were far less
enthusiastic.
The degree of opposition to German unification fi'om Margaret
Thatcher that emerges in these pages is striking. She was so worried that
border changes would underInine Gorbachev and the elltire reform
process in the Soviet Union that in the Fall of I
<)W)
she repeatedly sup–
ported the continued existence of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In
this same period, l3ush made clear his support for German "self-determi–
nation" and for democr;lCY in the still existing German Democratic
R.epublic. Thatcher told l3ush that German reunification would mean that
Corbachev would be replaced by hard-liners in Moscow who would blame
him fl.)]" losing Eastern Europe and East Germany and perll1itting the
emergence of the nightll1are of a unified Germany. Franc,:ois Mitterand's
views were less firm but he too sought to balance Franco-Gerll1an coop–
eration wi th French fears.
Third, Zelikow and R.ice explain how Europe's, including Moscow's,
fears of Gerl1lan unification werc overcol1le. In
1<)~<)-1l)<)()
political lead–
ers were following popuLlr sl'ntil1lent: the peoples of East Germany,
Poland, Hungary
~lIld
Czechoslovakia were outpacing thenl. In November
I
<)~<),
Kohl's ten-point prograln, calling f()r tLlIldamental political and eco–
nomic change in East Gerln;lIlY, ti'ee elections and possible Gerll1an unity,
was the most successful eH(xt to harness popular energies for long-held
political goals. Kohl's plan caused understandable unhappiness in East
l3erlin and on the West German left as well as in London, Paris and
Moscow. Yet he repeatedly received strong
~upport
ti'om l3ush. l30th
agreed that so long
:IS
GerIn:lIl unitication wellt hand in hand with con–
tinued GertlLlIl intl'gLltion into the Western Alliance it would contribute
to peace and stability in Europe. Such quick changes accompanied by so
much popular emotion were unsettlll1g to many European leaders .
In my view, the book supports the thesis that a tLlIldamental change,
indced a t()J"t'ign policy IT\'olution, in Moscow's thinking ,lbout the
