FROM CASES OF HYSTERIA TO THE THERAPEUTIC SOCIETY
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Psychologies,
who propose that aspects of the four frames of reference dom–
inant in America-drive, ego, self, and object relations theory-are
clinically
useful and should all be applied in every analytic treatment, while theoret–
ically, this is the theories themselves, cannot be integrated. And finally,
there are those of us who feel strongly that, while on the one hand, we
subscribe to pluralism in theories, to maintain their roots and understand
their origins and differences, on the other hand we find that the various
frames of reference also parallel, overlap and complement each other and
can and should be integrated
both
theoretically and clinically under the
larger umbrella of modern ego psychology for a richer and more complete
psychoanalytic theory, with object relations theory adding the understand–
ing of earlier development of ego and superego, self-psychology adding to
a wider and more meaningful self-concept, a.s.o. Thus the theories can be
integrated abstractly, as well as clinically, so that all theories are applicable
sooner or later in every analytic case at different times.
To be more specific. It is intriguing, by the way, to note that the actu–
al ti des chosen for the different sessions presented at this impressive, almost
all inclusive symposium, each session addressing a different major area of
"breaking traditions," referring
to
important changes in social structure,
philosophy, literature, and history-titles such as "Social Science: From
Rationality to Subjectivity" or "Philosophy: From Metaphysics to
Language Philosophy" also coincide and reflect some of the changes and
major trends within the narrower field of psychoanalysis and psychoana–
lytic thought itself and indeed still are areas of some important
controversies in the field today, as I shall try to briefly survey here. Perhaps,
though, this correspondence is not surprising, since all cultural and intel–
lectual areas do overlap and impact on each other and are not, nor can they
be, discussed in isolation. Thus changes in one area would find correspon–
dence in another.
In line then, with the title of our first session on social sciences: "From
Rationality to Subjectivity," there has been a similar shift in the psychoan–
alytic atti tude. Freud started a "dialogue wi th unreason" in stressing the
Unconscious, which he postulated as ruled by irrational, primary process
thinking and the pleasure principle. This earned
him
initial praise from
Michel Foucault. However, Freud also stressed the need for rational, sec–
ondary process thinking, the reality principle, to overcome and civilize the
unconscious cauldron of drives with the goal of treatment as "where id
was there ego shall be." This rational, "normalizing" attitude then quickly
became the focus of Foucault's attack. Freud believed in logic and reason
and objective external reality balancing and in opposition to the psychic
reality which he equated with the unconscious drives. Freud posited the
therapeutic action of psychoanalysis as making the unconscious conscious
and the curative goal of reconstruction of the real past---similar to the
