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PARTISAN REVIEW
today's Viennese are proud to live in "Wittgenstein's Vienna"-the title of
the famous book by Janik and Toulmin. But the legacy of this epoch is still
ambivalent: Wittgenstein's Vienna was also "Hitler's Vienna" (the title of
Brigitte Hamann's recently published book) and the list of concepts Hitler
acquired in Vienna (as he wrote himself in
Mein Kampf)
is long.
If we look into the evolution of the surviving elements of the last fin
de siecle mentality, we have to focus on the central poles of "end" and
"turn" (Ende and Wende). Today the feeling of "ending" dominates west–
ern and central European societies. It is the "end" of what Ralph
Dahrendorf calls the "social democratic century." By that I mean social
democratic with a little "s" which is more like the synthesis of liberalism
and reason than the ideology of a specific party and is connected to an atti–
tude towards life: a conglomeration of val ues, expectations, calculable risks
in life, and regular action by the state as a result of public consensus. This
"ending" attacks Austrian society more strongly than comparable states,
because it is an extremely state-oriented society. Private influence even in
the form of organized interests is weak: economy, education, cultural life,
the social system, even sports are furthered by state finances and organiza–
tions. This is exactly where, over decades of creeping crises in nationalized
industry, the delegitimization of the social-democratic century began. The
uniquely Austrian stratification of power, the so-cal led social partnership,
guaranteed the influence of organized groups of trade unions, agriculture
and industry, that were inseparably connected to the state itself. Social part–
nership and the Austrian version of the social democratic century are
inseparable. The ability to regulate this inflated public household helped to
legitimize the position of power groups. But this legitimization is endan–
gered by the budgetary crisis. The leading mechanisms of the social
democratic century are falling into disrepute as financially unviable, as lux–
ury bought on credit. Moreover, the state can no longer finance new public
programs, due to the limits on public debts dictated by the Maastricht treaty.
Although Austria still has a dominant political con ensus, polarization is
beginning: the extremely stable party system has dramatically changed from
a system with two large parties, to one of three medium-sized and two
small parties-whose limits are still unknown. On the one hand, there is a
collective feeling of crisis, resulting from menacing unemployment, from
the confrontation with a new type of poverty, and from the threatened
modification of the welfare system. On the other hand, resistance to taxes
is growing, and is backed by prominent experts, and accompanied by an
unconscionable debate about "welfare bums." Whereas the crisis at the turn
of the last century was centered in the private sphere, such as gender roles,
it now focuses on demands and duties towards and within society.
Another "end" arises from the loss of the privileged posi tion of the
older industrialized states. The growing international competition for jobs
