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PARTISAN REVIEW
how did we find ourselves in an atmosphere of preposterous announce–
ments in paper after paper, book after book, that all previous work in the
area is hopelessly misconceived, and here is a radically new approach
which will revolutionize the whole field?
As ever more complex and sophisticated equipment is needed to con–
trive ever more
recherche
observations, research in the sciences has become
ever more expensive; a cuI ture of grants-and-research-projects has grown
up and science has become,
inter alia,
big business. The consequences for
science itself are not altogether healthy; but when disciplines like philoso–
phy, where serious work requires, not fancy equipment, but only (only!)
time and peace of mind, mimic the organization of the sciences, when the
whole apparatus of grants-and-research-projects becomes so ordinary that
we scarcely notice how extraordinary it is, when we adapt to a business
ethos, the consequences are still worse.
In part because it is so intellectually impressive, in part because it is so
useful, and in part, no doubt, because it is so expensive, science enjoys enor–
mous prestige, in which the rest of us would dearly like to share. And,
inevitably perhaps, as a consequence of universities' having become such
big businesses, many university administrators have become enamored of a
business management ethos which values "entrepreneurial skills," i.e., the
ability to obtain large sums of money to undertake large research projects,
above originality or depth, and which encourages conceptions of
"effi–
ciency" and "productivity" more appropriate to a manufacturing plant
than to the pursuit of truth.
In disciplines like philosophy, feeling ourselves the poor relations in
such a culture, we have adapted with a kind of entrepreneurship which
diverts us from real work, and is sometimes, to speak plainly, nothing more
than hucksterism: centers for this and that, new journals for the legit–
imization and promotion of the latest fad, projects requiring secretaries,
research assistants, or, better yet, more expensive and powerful computers
or, best of all, a laboratory. Our adaptation has lowered the motive with
which philosophical work is done, fostering sham and fake inquiry and
eroding intellectual integri ty.
It
has significantly affected what kinds of work get done, channeling
effort into areas judged likely to attract funding-e.g., interdisciplinary
work which allies philosophy with more prestigious disciplines such as
cognitive psychology or artificial intelligence or medicine, etc. It has also
significantly affected what kinds of conclusions are reached. Where effort
is directed by the hope oflarge grants into, say, the border territory of epis–
temology with cognitive science, the probability rises that the conclusion
that will be reached is that long-standing epistemological questions can be
quickly resolved or as quickly dissolved by appeal to this or that work in
cognitive science. Where effort is directed by the hope oflarge grants into,
