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PARTISAN REVIEW
As you are probably already beginning to suspect, I don't think philos–
ophy is at present in a particularly desirable condi tion. I am especially
troubled by an increasingly articulate irrationalism, a despair of the very
possibili ty of hones t inquiry. And I hope to show how the environment in
which philosophical work is presently conducted-the ethos of inquiry, in
the words of my title-has contributed to this despair.
Genuine inquiry aims at the truth. This is a tautology
(Webster~:
"inquiry: search for truth, information or knowledge ...") . There is, how–
ever, a lot of pseudo-inquiry about; that is why, when the government
institutes an Official Inquiry into this or that, some of us reach for our
scare quotes. The difference between pseudo-inquiry and the real thing is
in the motive: while a genuine inquirer seeks the truth of some question,
whatever the color of that truth, a pseudo-inquirer seeks to make a case for
the truth of some proposition(s) determined in advance.
Pseudo-inquiry comes in two main kinds. A sham reasoner is con–
cerned not to find out how thing really are, but to make a ca e for some
proposition to which he is already unbudgeably committed. A fake rea–
soner is concerned not to find out how things really are, but to advance
himself by making a case for some proposition to the truth-value of which
he is indifferent.
Genuine truth-seeking tends to advance inquiry, while sham and fake
reasoning tend to impede it. Both fake and, especially, sham reasoners are
motivated to avoid examining any apparently contrary evidence or argu–
ment too closely, to play down its importance or impugn its relevance, to
contort themselves explaining it away. Both sham and, especially, fake rea–
soners are motivated to indulge in that "affected obscurity" which Locke
recognized as a chief occupational hazard of philosophy.
The genuine inquirer, by contrast, wants to get to the truth of the mat–
ter that concerns him, whether or not that truth comports with what he
believed at the outset, and whether or not his acknowledgment of that
truth is likely to get him tenure, or to make him rich, famous, or popular.
So he is motivated to seek out and assess the worth of evidence and argu–
ments thoroughly and impartially. He will be ready to acknowledge, to
himself as well as others, where his evidence and arguments seem shakiest
and his articulation of problem or solution vaguest. He will be willing to
go with the evidence even to unpopular conclusions, and to acknowledge
someone else's having found the truth he was seeking. And, far from hav–
ing a motive to obfuscate, he will try to see, and explain, things as clearly
as he can.
Sham or fake reasoners may hit upon the truth, and, when they do, may
come up with good evidence and arguments. Commitment to a cause,
desire for reputation, are powerful motivating forces which can prompt
energetic intellectual effort. But the intelligence and ingenui ty that help a
