FROM METAPHYSICS TO LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY
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hand, has ometimes lead philosophers of the highest quality to jump to
hasty generalizations when they were inspired and excited enough about
how we might go about solving pressing human problems.
For the last four hundred years in Western civilization, the scientific
mode of thinking had been proven impressive, if only by way of its great
productivi ty. It still is, of course, although there is now much dismay about
the extrapolation methods used in the natural sciences to all other studies.
Most of our technology, productivity, and the gadgets and technology we
now take for granted are the re ults of science and among many this still
sustains a confidence in applying universally the sort of thinking that seems
to have made them possible. The hopefulness in social engineering can be
accounted for by reference to the prevalence of scientific thinking, even
scientism. Except for Immanuel Kant, few have attempted to abandon sci–
entism. Kant did it at the cost of reinvigorating dualism, which has always
been intellectually uncomfortable to accept because, among other reasons,
of the problem of the interaction of two fundamentally different realms.
Another important reason why the positivist approach had been wide–
ly embraced is that the only powerful normative defense of liberalism had
purged prudence from its midst. Kantianism, though normative and sup–
portive of classical liberal insti tutions, had no solid place for the virtue of
prudence, which might have been used to defend the classical liberal eco–
nomic order, capitalism, on moral grounds.
Within the Kantian tradition of ethical thinking goals or results (that is,
the ends or objectives of action) the virtues enabling one to reach them are
deemed to be morally secondary. Doing what is right cannot be defended
by reference to one's ends, only by reference to the dictates of a categorical
imperative. Yet, if prudence-which aims at self-enhancement-is not a
virtue, it is difficult to see how one could morally respect the activities that
comprise much of the free market. There can be nothing seriously right
about triving
to
make a profit, trying to prosper in life. Virtues such as fru–
gality, industry, fortitude and such are unavailable as
bona fide
moral traits
within the post-Kantian moral philosophical tradition.
Yes, some defenders of liberalism appear to find it sufficient, from the
moral point of view, that in a liberal polity all interpersonal actions are car–
ried out by mutual consent. Yet, this isn't sufficient because people can
cooperate to their own moral detriment-e.g., when they exchange hero–
in for cocaine and proceed to abuse both drugs. Freedom is not really a
personal virtue but a precondition of such virtues. As Hayek wrote:
That freedom is the matrix required for the growth of moral val ues–
indeed not nterely one value among many but the source of all
values-is almo t self-evident. It is only where the individual has
