AMERICA AND THE EMERGING EUROPE
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disquieting ambivalence (in fact, multivalence) . A secular and humanist
universalism (including some double standards) must confront numerous
political theologies. Concepts of modernization collide with postmod–
em concepts of re-naturalization. Arms control perspectives are chal–
lenged by new forms of militarism. All this underlines the necessity to re–
flect upon the means by which order is traditionally established and pro–
tected - through power.
As the American political scientist Joseph S. Nye put it, the structure
of power resembles a three-dimensional chess game: "The top, military
board is uni'polar, with the United States being the only country capable
of projecting global military force. The middle , economic board is
tripolar. The United States, the European Union and Japan account for
two-thirds of the world economy. China's dramatic economic growth
may make this board quadripolar by the tum of the century. The bot–
tom board consists of diverse transnational relationships outside the con–
trol of governments, including economic flow, drug trafficking, terror–
ism, and depletion of the ozone layer. On this board, there are no
poles."
In other words, the distribution of power in inter- and transnational
politics does not allow for a clear-cut hierarchy, for military power may
be useless in dealing with the economic power of states and may just be
the wrong force to influence political developments. Nye points to the
European Union and not to Germany when referring to the great eco–
nomic power of this macro-region. There is, indeed, a certain ambiguity
as to the concentration of economic power. For it is distributed among
non-states, states, and in the case ofWestern Europe, the Union.
The German foreign and security policy establishment and,
cum grano
salis,
public opinion (as far as it deals with politics) are not happy with
the implications of recent developments. That which has been labeled
with the euphemism "international responsibility" is regarded as a Greek
gift. This is mostly a consequence of two positive experiences: After the
defeat of National Socialism, the new German polity was conceived in
such a way that National Socialism and other such movements would
never again win over the minds of Germans. This included, among other
things, a strong rejectiol1 of nationalism and unilateralism in matters of
foreign policy. German foreign policy emphasizes concepts like multilat–
eralism and integration. Article 24 of the Basic Law allows the Federa–
tion to transfer sovereign powers to inter-governmental institutions. This
perspective became evident during the decades of the East-West conflict.
It is part of West Germany's political culture. Multilateral legitimation
for Germany's foreign and security policy seems to be a prerequisite for
